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Abstract 
The following dissertation explains how technological change of wind power, in terms of 
cost reduction and performance improvement, is achieved in China and the US through energy 
policies, technological learning, and collaboration. The objective of this dissertation is to 
understand how energy policies affect key actors in the power sector to promote renewable energy 
and achieve cost reductions for climate change mitigation in different institutional arrangements. 
The dissertation consists of three essays. 
The first essay examines the learning processes and technological change of wind power 
in China. I integrate collaboration and technological learning theories to model how wind 
technologies are acquired and diffused among various wind project participants in China through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)—an international carbon trade program, and 
empirically test whether different learning channels lead to cost reduction of wind power. Using 
pooled cross-sectional data of Chinese CDM wind projects and spatial econometric models, I find 
that a wind project developer’s previous experience (learning-by-doing) and industrywide wind 
project experience (spillover effect) significantly reduce the costs of wind power. The spillover 
effect provides justification for subsidizing users of wind technologies so as to offset wind farm 
investors’ incentive to free-ride on knowledge spillovers from other wind energy investors. The 
CDM has played such a role in China. Most importantly, this essay provides the first empirical 
evidence of “learning-by-interacting”: CDM also drives wind power cost reduction and 
performance improvement by facilitating technology transfer through collaboration between 
foreign turbine manufacturers and local wind farm developers. 
The second essay extends this learning framework to the US wind power sector, where I 
examine how state energy policies, restructuring of the electricity market, and learning among 
actors in wind industry lead to performance improvement of wind farms. Unlike China, the 
restructuring of the US electricity market created heterogeneity in transmission network 
governance across regions. Thus, I add transmission network governance to my learning 
framework to test the impacts of different transmission network governance models. Using panel 
data of existing utility-scale wind farms in US during 2001-2012 and spatial models, I find that 
the performance of a wind project is improved through more collaboration among project 
participants (learning-by-interacting), and this improvement is even greater if the wind project is 
interconnected to a regional transmission network coordinated by an independent system operator 
or a regional transmission organization (ISO/RTO). 
In the third essay, I further explore how different transmission network governance models 
affect wind power integration through a comparative case study. I compare two regional 
transmission networks, which represent two major transmission network governance models in 
the US: the ISO/RTO-governance model and the non-RTO model. Using archival data and 
interviews with key network participants, I find that a centralized transmission network 
coordinated through an ISO/RTO is more effective in integrating wind power because it allows 
resource pooling and optimal allocating of the resources by the central network administrative 
agency (NAO). The case study also suggests an alternative path to improved network effectiveness 
for a less cohesive network, which is through more frequent resource exchange among subgroups 
within a large network. On top of that, this essay contributes to the network governance literature 
by providing empirical evidence on the coexistence of hierarchy, market, and collaboration in 
complex service delivery networks. These coordinating mechanisms complement each other to 
provide system flexibility and stability, particularly when the network operates in a turbulent 
environment with changes and uncertainties. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
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China and the United States are the top two energy consumers and carbon emitters in the 
world. In response to global climate change and energy security concerns, governments in both 
countries have implemented various energy polices to increase the share of renewable energy in 
their electricity supply, particularly wind energy. During the past two decades, both countries have 
experienced tremendous technological change in wind power. Understanding how these energy 
policies affect key actors in the power sector to promote renewable energy in different institutional 
contexts is important for global energy governance and climate change mitigation. In this context, 
my dissertation explains how technological change of wind power, in terms of cost reduction and 
performance improvement, is achieved in China and the US from perspectives of energy policies, 
technological learning, and collaboration.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the technological change of wind power in China over the period 
2002-2009 after the Chinese government joined the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)—a 
project-based international carbon trade mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. CDM has been the 
most important international financial support program for the development of renewable energy 
in China, which has subsidized a majority share of Chinese wind projects since 2002. In this essay, 
I integrate collaboration and technological learning theories to establish a theoretical framework 
explaining how wind power technologies are acquired and diffused among various wind project 
participants in China. Using data on CDM wind projects in China and spatial econometric models, 
I empirically test the impacts of different learning channels—learning through R&D in wind 
turbine manufacturing, learning from a firm’s previous wind project experience, spillovers from 
industrywide project experience, and learning through the collaboration between project developer 
and turbine manufacturer—on wind power cost reduction and performance improvement. 
Studying one of the world’s largest wind power producers, in which most of the wind projects are 
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supported by CDM, this essay provides evidence on how international carbon finance has 
facilitated technological change in the wind power sector in China, which informs other 
developing countries that may wish to pursue similar policies.  
Chapter 3 extends this learning framework to the US wind power sector, where I analyze 
how state energy policies, restructuring of the electricity market, and learning among actors in 
wind industry lead to performance improvement of wind farms in US using a panel of all utility-
scale wind farms operating between 2001 and 2012. Unlike China, the US power sector has more 
heterogeneous institutional settings across regions. The restructuring of the electricity market 
resulted in two different models of regional transmission network governance since early 2000s. 
In most regions, the transmission networks are coordinated by seven third-party regional 
transmission system operators (ISO/RTOs), which serve as regional transmission system 
controllers to coordinate transmission services and organize the electricity wholesale market 
within their territories. In other non-RTO regions, the transmission systems are operated by their 
owners—vertically integrated utilities. Without a centralized independent transmission operator, 
these large utilities coordinate with each other to ensure region-wide reliability of the power 
system. In addition to testing learning effects in this essay, I also examine whether different 
transmission network governance models influence the learning dynamics among wind project 
participants and lead to different performance of wind farms.  
Chapter 4 further explores how transmission network governance in different regional 
electricity markets affect utilization of wind power through a comparative case study between an 
ISO/RTO-governed transmission network and a regional transmission network in non-RTO region. 
Drawn upon network governance theories, this essay examines how structural properties and 
coordinating mechanisms of the two transmission networks affect their effectiveness in integrating 
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wind power using archival data and interviews with key network participants. Massive integration 
of variable generation from wind imposes higher level of variability and uncertainty to the power 
system than traditional fuel sources, which requires better coordination among network 
participants to maintain system resilience. Thus, increased utilization of wind energy in power 
supply not only depends on state level energy policy incentives and induced improvement of wind 
technologies, but also the regional collaboration in the transmission network to integrate more 
wind generation into the grid. In Chapter 3, I provide empirical evidence that the regional 
collaboration on transmission operation contributes to higher wind power utilization rates. Chapter 
4 further highlights the underlying mechanisms allowing particular transmission network 
structural properties and coordinating processes to achieve both system stability and flexibility, 
and lead to better performance.  
My dissertation sheds light on how international as well as domestic energy policies are 
implemented through the network of actors in electricity markets embedded in different 
institutions. It informs policy design to forge effective cross-sectoral collaboration among these 
actors, at regional level or global level, to induce cost-reduction for climate change mitigation. In 
addition to its policy implications, it also bridges scholarship from network governance, 
collaboration, technological learning, and electricity market deregulation in explaining the 
relationship between energy policies and technological change in the power sector. Findings from 
the energy and power sector also extend existing network governance theories on managing the 
tension between network stability and flexibility, and inform future studies on resilience of other 
complex resource management or service delivery networks that operate in a turbulent 
environment with uncertainties and disruptions.  
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Chapter 2:  The Learning Process and Technological Change in Wind Power: 
Evidence from China’s CDM Wind Projects1 
  
                                                 
1 This chapter is a joint work of Tian Tang and David Popp. It has been published as: Tang, T., & Popp, D. 2016. The Learning 
Process and Technological Change in Wind Power: Evidence from China's CDM Wind Projects. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 35(1): 195–222.  
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2.1 Introduction 
As the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, China’s energy 
consumption and carbon emissions are a focus of global climate change and energy security talks. 
Because China has abundant wind resources with great development potential, increasing the share 
of wind power in China’s energy mix is a promising solution (Wang, 2010).  China’s wind industry 
has developed rapidly during the past ten years so that, in 2010, China became the worlds’ leader 
in cumulative installed wind capacity (GWEC, 2012).  As a result of this massive wind capacity 
expansion, China has also developed a domestic wind manufacturing supply chain (Wang et al., 
2012). This immense progress is driven by a variety of policy instruments that the Chinese 
government implemented to incentivize investment in wind energy, including domestic policies 
and international support.  
Perhaps the most notable international support program for the development of renewable 
energy in China is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It is an international project-based 
carbon trade mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol that assists developed countries to fulfill their 
committed emission reductions through financing projects that can reduce carbon emissions in 
developing countries. A secondary goal of the CDM is to help these developing countries achieve 
sustainable development through the transfer of climate-friendly technologies from developed 
countries. If the technologies transferred via CDM projects lead to subsequent diffusions within 
the country, it will reduce the future abatement costs of carbon emissions and drive technological 
change in the energy sector of the recipient country (Popp, 2011).  
In this paper, we use data on CDM wind projects in China to examine the impact of 
technology transfer and analyze how CDM has led to technological change in China, measured by 
both cost reduction and productivity improvement of wind power. Specifically, we ask whether 
the costs of wind power fall (or whether wind farm productivity increases) after more wind projects 
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have been installed by the same project developer or wind turbine manufacturer (learning-by-
doing). We also test whether learning occurs after other similar projects in the industry (spillover 
effect). Moreover, we test if costs fall (or productivity increases) after repeated collaboration 
between the project developer and a particular foreign turbine manufacturer on previous wind 
projects (learning-by-interacting), which suggests technology transfer through their international 
collaboration. In addition, we also test other drivers of technological change, such as R&D in wind 
turbine manufacturing (learning-by-searching). 
Our paper has policy implications for international climate policy makers and energy 
technology policy makers in developing countries. Studying one of the world’s largest wind power 
producers, in which most of the wind projects are supported by CDM, it sheds light on how CDM, 
as an international carbon financing program, has facilitated technological change in the energy 
sector of countries hosting CDM projects. On the one hand, CDM works as a subsidy to users of 
wind technologies, inducing massive deployment of wind power, and potentially driving cost-
reduction through learning-by-doing. On the other hand, evidence of learning-by-interacting 
between foreign turbine manufacturers and local wind farm developers indicates that CDM also 
drives technological progress in developing countries by facilitating technology transfer through 
repeated international collaboration. While some countries, such as China, explicitly promoted 
technology transfer as a goal of CDM, particularly in the early years of CDM as they developed 
their own technological capabilities, not all countries do so. For example, India states that 
technology transfer can come from within or outside of the country, and Brazilian CDM guidelines 
make no direct reference to technology transfer (UNFCC, 2010; Haites, Duan, and Seres 2006). 
Our learning-by-interacting framework allows us to assess whether technology transfer from CDM 
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wind projects has truly improved wind technology in China, providing evidence for other countries 
that may wish to pursue such policies.  
In addition to its policy implications, our study contributes to both the CDM and 
technological learning literature. Despite the empirical work from Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) 
testing Kyoto Protocol’s impacts on carbon emission reduction across country, existing studies 
examining CDM’s efficacy on its secondary goal—transfer of renewable energy technologies and 
the subsequent diffusion of these technologies in developing countries are mostly qualitative and 
descriptive (Lewis, 2010; Schneider, 2008; Schneider, Schmidt, & Hoffmann, 2010; B. Wang, 
2010). While several empirical studies analyze the determinants of technology transfer via CDM 
projects (Seres, 2007& 2009; Dechezlepretre, 2008& 2009; Hascic & Johhnstone, 2011; Schmid, 
2011), empirical evidence on the impacts of technology transfer – the technological progress 
induced by CDM projects – is inadequate. We address this intellectual gap by providing empirical 
evidence on technological progress in China’s CDM wind projects, and by explaining what has 
led to this technological progress. Our paper adds to technological learning literature by 
incorporating collaboration theories to explain the learning process and providing the first 
empirical evidence for a learning-by-interacting effect. Built on the existing literature that tests 
learning-by-doing and learning-by-searching effects, we show that the collaborations between 
project developers and foreign turbine manufacturers is an very important source of learning that 
takes place in the Chinese wind industry.  
2.2 The CDM and Domestic Policies for Wind Power Development in China  
2.2.1 Policy instruments and technological change in China’s wind industry 
Two market failures affect the innovation and adoption of renewable energy technologies 
– non-priced environmental damages caused by fossil fuel energy and under-investment in new 
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technologies due to knowledge spillovers (Jaffe et al.,2005). Since the negative externalities of 
fossil fuel power are not included in energy prices, wind power is currently much more expensive 
than electricity generated from coal and natural gas in China (Qiu and Anadon, 2012). Moreover, 
private firms do not consider the potential social benefits from knowledge spillovers when 
investing in wind technology, leading to underinvestment.   
Due to these market failures, policy tools are often used to induce technological change in 
wind power. The Chinese government has implemented a bundle of domestic policies to facilitate 
wind power deployment and to promote domestic wind technology advancement. In addition, it 
has also actively promoted international collaboration to foster technology transfer and redirect 
domestic investment in wind energy (Zhang et al., 2009; Lewis, 2010).  As shown in Table 2-1, 
these policy instruments can be classified as technology-push policies that subsidize the wind 
technology R&D activities and demand-pull policies that stimulate the demand for wind 
technologies (Nemet, 2009).   
2.2.1.1 Policy attributes of domestic demand-pull policies  
Demand-pull policies directly target wind farm installation and wind power generation. 
They can be further classified into two categories depending on the type of incentives they provide. 
Policies such as the national concession programs, the power surcharge for wind power, and the 
national benchmark feed-in tariffs (FIT)2 based on wind resources in different regions (NDRC, 
2009) encourage wind power generation by providing a subsidy to wind power generators per kWh 
electricity they produce. Other policies incentivize wind turbine installation, such as wind power 
installation targets for 2010, and the relief of value added tax (VAT) and import tax for wind 
turbine purchases. To promote the installation of domestic manufactured wind turbines, since 2005 
                                                 
2 Feed-in tariff is a cost-based price paid to renewable generators for the renewable electricity they supply to the grid 
based on a long-term power purchase agreement, which is usually higher than the retail electricity price.  
10 
a domestic content requirement mandates that wind projects must use wind turbines with 70% 
content made in China. This requirement has also facilitated technology transfer by incentivizing 
foreign wind turbine manufacturers to establish China-based manufacturing facilities to meet the 
local content percentage (Lewis, 2013). 
2.2.1.2 Roles of CDM and its interaction with domestic policies 
Providing international financial support, CDM mainly plays two roles in the development 
of China’s wind industry. First, it works as a demand-pull policy that subsidizes wind power 
producers through international carbon trade, and thus creates huge demand for wind technology 
in China. At the same time, it also aims at facilitating the transfer of wind technology from 
developed countries to China (Lewis, 2010 & 2013; Zhang et al., 2009). 
Complementary to the FITs provided by major domestic wind policies, CDM has also 
subsidized most wind projects in China since 2002. As shown in Figure 2-1, the total installed 
capacity with financial support from CDM account for 74.7% of the total installed capacity in 
China from 2003 to 2009.  While a wind project developer can expect a guaranteed FIT when the 
project is approved by the government, financial difficulties may still exist. In such cases, the 
developer will apply or is encouraged by the government to apply to become a CDM project. The 
key criteria for CDM project approval is whether a project can use methods provide by CDM rules 
to demonstrate its “additionality” – the proposed wind project could not be developed without the 
revenue from CDM due to its high financial risk or technical barriers. Otherwise, its application 
will be rejected. Once the CDM executive board approves a wind project for CDM registration, 
the project can get emission credits, known as certified emission reductions (CERs), based on its 
electricity generation. The project developer can then sell these CERs to buyers from developed 
countries, and use this revenue to subsidize its investment. On average, revenue from CDM is 
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about 0.05 to 0.1 RMB/kWh, which approximately equals 10%-20% of the average FITs for wind 
power (Lewis, 2010 & 2013; Li, 2010; Zhang et al, 2009).  
The domestic wind manufacturing sector in China was originally developed on the basis 
of foreign wind technologies and CDM was one of the channels for this technology transfer. Before 
the domestic content requirements, financial support from CDM enabled wind project developers 
to adopt foreign manufactured turbines. After Chinese wind manufacturers had built their 
manufacturing capacities through technology transfer, they further improved their technical 
capacity and dominated the Chinese market during the massive deployment of wind turbines 
driven by both domestic policies and CDM supports (Lewis, 2010 & 2011; Zhang et al., 2009; Ru 
et al., 2011). As an evidence of this trend, Figure 2-2 shows that turbines from Chinese 
manufacturers became the majority of the annual installation in CDM projects since 2006.  
2.2.2  Rationale for using CDM wind projects data  
Existing studies on the relationship between policy instruments and the technological 
progress in China’s wind industry are mainly qualitative and descriptive (Zhang et al., 2009; Wang, 
2010; Ru et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Lewis, 2013). Moreover, most of 
them focus on domestic policy tools, and an analysis of the link between policy instruments and 
technological change is often missing. Empirical research explaining technological change in 
China’s wind power is rare. The only empirical study has been the work of Qiu and Anadon (2012). 
Using wind projects from China’s national concession programs3 from 2003 to 2007, they examine 
factors influencing the price of wind power measured by the bidding price of each bidder 
participating in the national concession programs. They find that the joint-learning from 
                                                 
3 Prior to 2009, any wind project in China with capacities over 50 MW would go through a national concession bidding 
process managed by the central government to select its developer. The bidder who offered the “best price” under the 
terms provided by the bidding method would win the right to build the wind farm and sell the electricity at its bidding 
price to the grid. From 2003 to 2008, five rounds of national concession bidding programs produced 18 wind projects 
(Zhang et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012). 
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technology adoption and installation experience, localization of wind turbine manufacturing, and 
wind farm economies of scale significantly affect the price of wind power. However, their sample 
only includes 15 wind projects, which accounts for less than 50% of the total installed capacity 
nationwide during the observing period. In addition to its small sample, the bidding price they use 
may underestimate the production cost of wind power. Large players, such as big state-owned 
developers that are not driven by a profit-maximization objective, could commit to below cost 
prices in order to win the contract first (Li et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2010).  
We use CDM data in this paper because it provides a more representative sample and less 
distorted production cost of wind power. Our sample accounts for about 75% of the total installed 
capacity in China during our observing period. Moreover, CDM wind projects are registered and 
managed in a highly standardized and transparent process according to the CDM legal framework 
as shown in Figure 2-3. All the application materials submitted by the project developer, including 
a Project Design Document (PDD) and supporting material such as a financial analysis, must be 
validated by a third party auditing agency (i.e. the designated operational entity) before its 
registration. For all projects reaching the registration stage, their PDDs and supporting financial 
analysis are available on the CDM official website for public comments before registration. During 
its operation, electricity generation is monitored by another independent agency. The validation 
and monitoring reports are also available on the CDM website to provide a record of the complete 
process. All these independent and transparent auditing and monitoring procedures ensure the 
validity of the project cost and generation data provided by CDM project documents.  
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Using CDM wind projects in China, we explain how technological change has occurred as 
a result of learning from different participants in the Chinese wind industry given the current policy 
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incentives. Understanding this learning process can inform future policy design to facilitate 
different channels of learning.  
Our primary measure of technological change in wind power is the reduction of unit 
electricity production cost (Junginger et al., 2005; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013). We 
further examine two components of the overall technological change. First is the reduction in wind 
farm capital investment costs per kW, which has a major influence on electricity production cost 
(Junginger et al., 2005). Second, we study improvements in wind farm productivity using capacity 
factor, which compares a wind farm’s actual annual electricity generation to its potential annual 
output if the wind farm operates at its full capacity.  
The learning process in our study refers to how knowledge related to wind power is 
acquired and diffused among different participants in the wind projects, including project 
developers and wind turbine manufacturers.  In China, power generation and power transmission 
are separated. Wind project developers are power companies in charge of electricity generation, 
which are either state-owned enterprises or private power companies. Project developers purchase 
wind turbines from either domestic or foreign wind turbine manufacturers, who work closely with 
project developers in wind farm installation and operation. During their interactions in wind 
turbine installation, onsite training, and the maintenance services provided from the manufacturers, 
both participants learn more about how to adapt wind turbines to a particular site, which may 
potentially improve the performance of the wind farm.  
Based on both technological learning and collaboration theories, we identify the following 
channels of learning that could lead reduced electricity production costs.4  
                                                 
4 In the following sections, we only state our hypotheses for the overall technological change measured by unit 
production cost. We expect the same learning effects on its two components – unit capital costs and capacity factor. 
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2.3.1 Learning by doing (LBD) 
The traditional learning curve model explains increased productivity, typically measured 
through reduced production costs, as a function of learning from the accumulation of experience 
in production (Arrow, 1962). Experience curves have been widely used to model the cost reduction 
of renewable technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, wind turbine manufacturing, and wind 
power production (Grubler et al., 1999; Ibenholt, 2002; Junginger et al., 2005; Nemet, 2006 & 
2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013).  
In wind power, the unit cost of electricity production could be reduced through the 
accumulation of experience in wind turbine manufacturing and installation, and/or through the 
accumulation of experience in wind project development and operation. As the wind turbine 
manufacturer’s experience in turbine production and installation increases over time, the cost of 
manufacturing and installing a wind turbine may decrease. Similarly, experience of developing 
and operating wind projects helps project developers learn more about choosing a quality site, 
selecting a suitable wind turbine, and operating the wind farm efficiently. Such experience will 
result in lower costs for wind power.  Thus, the first two hypotheses we test are: 
      H1: The more experience the CDM project developer has developing and operating wind 
projects, the lower the unit production costs of the current project will be.   
      H2: The greater the production and installation experience of a project’s wind turbine 
manufacturer, the lower the unit production costs of the current CDM project will be. 
2.3.2 Spillover effects 
Not only do firms learn from their previous within-firm experience, but they may also learn 
from external experience from other firms, described as spillover effects by the existing literature 
on innovation and technology policy (Gruber, 1998; Thornton and Thompson, 2001). Once a new 
technology has been commercialized, its use is hard to hide from rival firms. As a result, firms can 
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take advantage of the knowledge made available through the investment of other firms. This 
market failure provides justification for the government to subsidize emerging technologies so as 
to offset the private incentives to free-ride.   
In the wind industry, wind power companies can learn how to install and operate a wind 
farm from the experience of other wind projects (Nemet, 2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012). Using a 
panel data of wind projects in California, Nemet (2012) estimates the learning effects on wind 
farm installation and operation from a wind company’s internal experience, and from external 
experience in California and in the global market. The results indicate that wind farm developers 
learn from both internal and external experience on installation and operation. Such spillovers 
justify policies that subsidize the demand for wind technology. Similarly, Qiu and Anadon’s work 
(2012) on the Chinese wind industry also shows learning from industry-wide experience. As they 
point out, the details of all bids were made public, providing a source for other developers to learn. 
For CDM projects, the publicity of project documents allows industry-wide information sharing 
on project design and operation, which may particularly facilitate the spillovers among project 
participants in the whole industry.  Therefore, we also test: 
      H3: Increased experience developing and operating wind projects by other firms in the 
industry also leads to lower unit production costs for the current CDM project.  
2.3.3 Learning by searching (LBS) 
In the wind industry, innovation often takes place in the manufacturing sector. The process 
that technology improvement through manufacturers’ research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) leads to cost reductions or improvement of productivity in wind power, is referred to as 
“learning-by-searching” (LBS) (Junginger et al, 2005; Kahouli-Brahmi, 2008; Qiu and Anadon, 
2012). Examples of technological improvements through RD&D include larger turbines, lighter 
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materials, more efficient turbine design and improved control systems, which could either reduce 
the cost of a wind turbine or increase the efficiency of converting wind energy to electricity.   
Extending traditional one-factor learning curve models5 to include R&D, several recent 
studies use two-factor learning models to disentangle the impacts of R&D and cumulative 
experience on technological change in wind power (Soderholm & Klassen, 2007; Soderholm & 
Sundqvist, 2007; Qiu and Anadon, 2012). While the empirical studies on the European wind 
industry suggest that R&D is the dominant factor, Qiu and Anadon’s research on the Chinese wind 
industry, using an industry-wide knowledge stock, does not successfully separate the effect of LBS 
and LBD due to the multicollinearity between their LBD and LBS variables.  We use a 
manufacturer-specific stock of knowledge to test the learning-by-searching effect:  
      H4: The greater the knowledge stock that a turbine manufacturer accumulates through its 
R&D, the lower the unit production cost of the CDM project using its turbines will be.  
2.3.4 Learning by interacting (LBI)  
Existing literature on technological learning also discusses another channel of learning – 
learning by interacting (LBI). Improving network interactions between research institutes, 
manufacturers, and end-users allow for better diffusion of knowledge (Grubler, 1998; Junginger 
et al, 2005).  In collaboration and network theories, collaborative and long-term partnerships 
increase the likelihood of knowledge sharing by increasing trust and reducing information 
asymmetry between the two parties during the repeated cooperation (Inkpen & Currall 2004; 
Schneider, 2008). Firms can have some degree of access to the specialized knowledge of their 
partners while enhancing the existing knowledge and capacities within themselves (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990; Inkpen and Beamish 1997).  
                                                 
5 The one-factor learning curve model refers to learning-by-doing model as introduced in Section 3.1. This model 
only explains increased productivity as a function of learning from the accumulation of experience in production. 
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The wind project developer works with its turbine supplier in many stages within a project, 
and some of them collaborate with each other in multiple projects. Thus, there could be joint 
learning on wind farm installation and operation between project developer and the turbine 
manufacturer through their collaborations in previous wind projects. The CDM project design 
documents we have reviewed also provide some evidence that frequent communication and 
training activities regarding operation and maintenance between turbine suppliers and project 
developers contribute to the absorption and dissemination of wind technologies, particularly for 
advanced technologies embedded in the imported turbines. Therefore, we empirically test the 
learning through collaboration6 between project developers and manufacturers: 
      H5: The more collaboration that the developer has with the same manufacturer in previous 
wind projects, the lower the unit production cost of the current CDM project will be.   
One caveat about this hypothesis is that collaboration can lead to lower unit production 
costs through multiple possible mechanisms7 and learning-by-interacting may be just one of them. 
However, we also test whether more collaboration between a project developer and the 
manufacturer improves wind farm productivity. Since this is a purely technical improvement, it 
rules out other cost-related factors, such as reduced transaction costs, and focuses on technical 
improvement through collaboration. Thus, the underline mechanism for productivity gains should 
be joint learning and knowledge sharing during the interaction between the project developer and 
turbine manufacturer. 
                                                 
6 Collaboration is used synonymously with cooperation throughout this paper. 
7 Alternative mechanisms could be reducing information asymmetry and transaction costs, or discount on turbine 
prices to trusted developers. 
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2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Data 
To examine the effects that different learning channels have on unit production costs, unit 
capital cost, and capacity factor across wind projects, we use pooled cross-sectional data of 510 
registered CDM wind projects in China that started construction from 2002 to 2009.8  After 
excluding observations with missing data for unit cost or manufacturer’s patents, our final sample 
includes 486 projects.9  These projects were developed by 87 developers and used wind turbines 
from 23 turbine manufacturers. Therefore, many developers and turbine manufactures participated 
in more than one CDM wind project in China. A developer may have collaborated with the same 
wind turbine manufacturer in several projects.  
We combine several datasets for this study. The CDM project data, including information 
on project costs, project size, turbine size, annual electricity production, project developer, turbine 
manufacturers, project specific policies, and project coordinates are collected from the validated 
CDM PDDs and their financial analyses.10 Data on provincial level and manufacturer’s installed 
capacity comes from the Chinese Wind Energy Association’s annual reports. Although there are 
some wind projects not included in the CDM database, non-CDM installed capacity only accounts 
for a small share of the total installed capacity in China.11 Patent data for the knowledge stock 
                                                 
8 The project activity start year is the point at which key technical decisions, such as siting, turbine selection, wind 
farm operational hours are mad, and thus when previous experience and knowledge stock of developers and 
manufacturers will most influence project outcomes. Similarly, Qiu and Anadon’s (2012) analysis of bidding for wind 
contracts uses the tendering year, which is also the year that project costs are first estimated. 
9 Most observations that we delete are projects in early years. We conduct two sample t-tests between the projects we 
exclude and the usable projects from the same year on two other dependent variables, explanatory variables, and key 
control variables such as project size, turbine size and location. The t-test results suggest that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the observations from the two groups have the same mean at 5% significance level, which suggest that 
the missingness is random conditioning on year. We also did a robustness check by dropping all the observations from 
year 2002-2005 where most missing cases come from. The regression results from the subsample are very similar with 
our previous model with 486 observations, which suggests that the missing data does not bias the results. 
10All the CDM documents are available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html. 
11 We use installed capacity data from 2002 to 2008 to calculate the previous installation experience that a developer 
or a manufacturer has. The non-CDM installed capacity only accounts for 13% of the total installed capacity in 
China.  
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calculation comes from the Thomson Innovation database, and we collect energy market data at 
the provincial level from China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. 
2.4.2 Key variables  
2.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
We use three dependent variables to measure different aspects of technological change. 
1) Electricity production cost  
     Our primary dependent variable is the projected unit cost of electricity production of project 
i that starts construction in year t (Unit_costit), also known as the levelized cost. This cost measure 
enables us to compare our results with the previous literature on technological learning in wind 
power (Junginger et al., 2005; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013). We calculate the unit 
production cost by dividing the project’s projected lifetime cost by its projected electricity 


















where Captitalj is the static capital investment in the j
th year in project life n, O&Mj is the annual 
operation and maintenance expenditures in year j, and Electricityj represents the annual electricity 
generated by the wind farm in year j.12 We use a discount rate, r, of 8%, which is the industrial 
benchmark internal rate of return (IRR) on total investment. 13  The year that project i starts 
construction, represented by t, corresponds to the first year in its project life (i.e. j=1).  We adjust 
cost variables to 2005 prices.   
                                                 
12 Although the annual electricity production data we collect from CDM project design documents are estimated 
generation, actual generation is monitored after the project starts its operation. According to the monitoring reports 
we have examined, the estimated annual electricity production is very close to the actual generation.  
13 Internal rate of return on an investment or a project is the discount rate at which the net present value of costs equals 
the net present value of the benefits of the investment. According to the State Power Corporation’s “Interim Rules on 
Economic Assessment of Electrical Engineering Retrofit Projects”, the benchmark IRR for a project in power industry 
is 8% of the total investment. 
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While the cost data from CDM project documents are expected costs, using the CDM data 
provides several advantages. To prove additionality, proposed projects must not be financially 
viable without the revenue from selling emissions credits. Thus, project developers have no 
incentive to understate costs, which would overestimate technological progress. At the same time, 
the proposed project costs have been evaluated by independent auditors and projected costs that 
are unreasonably high would lead to rejection of a proposed project. For capital costs, the 
validating agencies usually crosscheck estimated capital costs with the actual costs specified in 
construction and equipment purchase contracts. According to the validation reports we have 
examined, the estimated capital costs are very close to the real capital investment. Moreover, many 
project design documents use actual capital costs in their financial analyses.14 For O&M costs, the 
auditing agencies compare the estimated costs with public statistics and other similar wind projects. 
Thus, we believe that our cost measurement is more reasonable and credible than the bidding prices 
used by Qiu and Anadon (2012). Bidding prices in the national concession program could be much 
lower than the actual price, which is often a strategy used by developers to win the project first 
without considering the long-term profitability (Li et al., 2008; Yang et al, 2009; Wang, 2010).  As 
shown in Table 2-2, the average winning prices in the national concession programs, in most cases, 
are lower than the average unit costs of the CDM projects at similar sites in a given province 
between 2003 and 200715, which is consistent with the above criticisms. Absent the availability of 
                                                 
14 To rule out the possibility that the project developers learn to produce more accurate cost estimation over time, we 
used stratified sampling to select 51 of our 510 projects by the year that a project started construction. For projects 
before 2006, the validation reports do not provide actual cost data, but they claim that they have cross-checked with 
the actual data and the estimation are consistent with the actual capital investment. For projects starting from 2006 to 
2009, the estimated costs are very close to the real capital costs for all years. Based on this validation, we believe that 
the possibility of better cost estimation is small. 
15 All the prices and unit costs are adjusted to the 2005 prices. We do not exclude value added taxes from the winning 
prices because costs are also subject to the same rate of value-added taxes. If value added taxes were excluded, winning 
prices would be even lower than the average unit costs of the CDM projects.  
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actual cost data for Chinese wind farms, we believe that our validated CDM data provide the most 
accurate representation of electricity production costs for wind projects in China. 
2) Unit capital cost 
The upfront capital investment costs of wind installation have a major influence on the 
overall costs of electricity production (Junginger et al., 2005). Capital investment includes costs 
for turbine foundations, land, grid connection, civil works, and turbine installation. Following 
existing studies on learning curves in wind power, we use wind farm capital investment per kW to 











3) Capacity factor 
We use projected capacity factor to measure the productivity of a wind farm. Capacity 
factor is the ratio of the actual annual electricity produced by a wind farm over its potential annual 








𝟐𝟒𝒉𝒓𝒔/𝒅𝒂𝒚 ∗ 𝟑𝟔𝟓 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒆𝒋𝒄𝒕_𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆
  
While electricity production has also been used to measure performance of a wind farm 
(Nemet, 2012), we use capacity factor because it normalizes electricity generation by project size, 
which is a more direct measurement for productivity rather than production, and is widely used to 
measure wind farm technical performance in wind industry reports (Wiser et al., 2011 & 2012). 
One concern about capacity factor is that it is mostly determined by the availability of wind, and 
is also strongly influenced by the grid quality in China’s case in addition to wind farm operation. 
We discuss our controls for these two factors in “control variables”.  
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2.4.2.2 Manufacturer’s knowledge stock (Learning-by-searching) 
Learning by searching depicts the process through which R&D activities lead to cost 
reduction. Previous studies testing LBS in the wind manufacturing sector model wind farm costs 
or wind power prices as a function of the knowledge stock, which is either derived from country 
level R&D expenditure or technologies adopted by turbine manufacturers (Klaassen et al., 2005; 
Kobos et al., 2006; Soderholm and Sundqvist, 2007; Qiu and Anadon, 2012). Since firm level 
R&D data are not available, we apply the same method using the outcome of R&D – a 
manufacturer’s patent applications on wind turbines – to create each firm’s knowledge stock 
(LBSmft): 
LBSmft=LBSt-1*(1-ρ) + NPt-1                (1) 
LBSt-1 represents the existing knowledge stock from year t-1, ρ is the depreciation rate, and NPt-1 
represents the number of new patents that the manufacturer applied for in year t-1. We lag the 
manufacturer’s knowledge stock to account for the time needed to convert an innovation to mass 
manufacturing. Since knowledge related to wind power may depreciate over time, we use a 15% 
depreciation rate to calculate the knowledge stock in our empirical model, which is a typical 
knowledge decay rate used in the R&D literature (Griliches, 1995; Popp, 2004).16  
We identify each turbine manufacturer’s global patent applications relevant to wind energy, 
which include innovations pertaining to wind turbine manufacturing, installation, testing and 
monitoring, and maintenance. 17  We date these applications by the priority date, the earliest 
application date for the invention at any patent office worldwide, as this corresponds most closely 
                                                 
16 We also test the effects of knowledge stock calculated with a 10% depreciation rate. The results are not sensitive to 
the choice of discount rates. 
17 We identify the relevant patents using the International Patent Classification (IPC), which is a classification system 
developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization and used by patent offices around the world to identify the 
technology represented in each patent. IPC classification F03D represents wind energy patents. If a manufacturer files 
patent applications in multiple countries to protect a single invention in those countries, we count all these patent 
applications in the same patent family as one patent.  
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to when the innovative activity actually took place. If a CDM project use wind turbines from two 
manufacturers, we calculate the weighted average knowledge stock using the shares of their 
installed capacity in this project as weights.  
2.4.2.3  Experience variables at different levels (Learning-by-doing & Spillovers)  
To test if additional wind farm installation and operation experience leads to lower unit 
costs, the existing experience curve literature estimates wind farm capital cost or wind power 
production cost as a function of the cumulative installation of wind farms or cumulative electricity 
generation (Grubler et al., 1999; Ibenholt, 2002; Junginger et al., 2005; Nemet, 2006 & 2012; Qiu 
and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013). We follow this approach to construct the project developer’s 
experience (LBDdev) and the turbine manufacturer’s experience (LBDmft). These experience 
variables are measured by the cumulative installed capacities through year t-1 for a project 
developer and a manufacturer respectively.  
If wind project installation and operation cannot be hidden from other competitors, a wind 
project can also benefit from the installation and operation experience from other projects in the 
industry. We use cumulative installed capacity at the industry level to measure total industry 
experience (Industry_experience). To test for spillover effects (Industry_spillover), we subtract 
the experience from project i’s developer and manufacturer from the total industry experience to 
calculate the experience from the rest of the industry, as in Nemet (2012) and Qiu and Anadon 
(2012).  
2.4.2.4  Collaborative experience (Learning-by-interacting) 
Since there have been no empirical test for learning-by-interacting effects so far, we follow 
the collaboration and network literature to measure the interactions between a project developer 
and a manufacturer. These empirical studies use frequency of collaborative activities or 
interactions among actors within a network or a partnership to measure the level of interaction and 
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collaboration among partners (O’Tool and Meier, 2004; Lundin, 2007).  Given our project level 
data, we construct our LBI variable as the cumulative capacity that a project developer and the 
same manufacturer have installed together in previous CDM wind projects.  This can also be 
thought of as the shared CDM experience between them. If a CDM project uses wind turbines 
from two manufacturers, we calculate the weighted average collaborating CDM experience using 
the shares of their installed capacity in this project as weights.   
2.4.2.5  Control variables 
Table 2-3 summarizes the definitions and constructions of all our learning variables and 
control variables. First, we control for wind turbine size, project size, and available wind resources, 
which directly affect project costs or wind farm productivity. A wind turbine with larger size 
usually has longer blades and a taller tower, allowing the wind turbine to capture the optimal wind 
resources at a given wind speed and improve its productivity (Nemet, 2012; EWEA, 2013).Wind 
projects with larger installed capacity will have economies of scale (Berry 2009, Qiu and Anadon, 
2012; Partridge, 2013). Projects located at sites with better wind resources can have higher 
productivity than projects with poorer wind resources.  
Second, we control for characteristics of manufacturers and developers that potentially 
influence both learning variables and project costs. We differentiate between foreign and domestic 
turbine manufacturers because foreign manufacturers usually have larger knowledge stocks and 
manufacture better wind turbines. We treat a foreign manufacturer’s subsidiary in China as a 
foreign manufacturer because its patents belong to the parent company. We also control for the 
ownership of the project developer using dummies. We expect state-owned developers (SOE) to 
have the lowest production costs because they dominate the electricity generation market and have 
more bargaining power (Li et al., 2010 & 2012).  
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Third, we include project-specific subsidies as control variables while using year-fixed 
effects to control for other national level policies such as the technology-push policies, domestic 
component requirements, wind installation targets, and tax incentives. Year fixed effects also 
control for items such as changing input prices and industry-wide and global technological change. 
The two project-specific subsidies are: 1) the expected feed-in tariff, determined under different 
domestic production-based policies discussed in section 2.2;18 and 2) the expected CER price, 
which is the extra revenue in addition to FIT that a CDM project developer can get from selling 
the certified emission reductions (CERs). In addition, we also include annual electricity 
consumption, coal consumption, and gas consumption in the province where project i is located in 
to control for the influence of energy market on wind power generation and costs.  
Finally, we use province dummies to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across 
provinces, such as topographical and meteorological features, grid accessibility, and the 
investment environment. 
2.4.3 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 2-4 reports summary statistics for the major variables used in our empirical models.  
The trends of the average unit production cost, unit capital cost, and capacity factor of CDM 
projects from 2002 to 2009 are shown in Figure 2-4, which depict the rapid technological change 
in China’s wind power during this period. Except for 2004, unit production costs and unit capital 
costs generally have downward trends from 2002 to 2009.19 The unit project cost falls by 12.14% 
from 2005 to 2009 and the unit capital cost drops by 7.38% from 2002 to 2009. In contrast, the 
                                                 
18 Since value added tax (VAT) is included in the FIT for some observations and excluded others, we calculate the 
FIT after tax for all the observations to make them comparable as well as to account for the effects of VAT. 
19 While the average project cost is lower in 2004, we only have one observation that has unit cost data among the 4 
projects that started in 2004 in our sample. Thus, the unit cost may not be representative of all the projects in 2004. 
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average capacity factor of wind farms has only improved slightly, by 1.61%, over the same time 
period. Since the capacity factor is mainly determined by the wind resources available and the 
accessibility of grid connection, one possibility is that projects started earlier could pick sites with 
better wind resources or sites that are easily connected to the existing grid network, leaving limited 
choices for later projects. As noted earlier, wind quality dummy variables and province fixed 
effects control for these factors in our regression analysis.  
2.5  Empirical Models and Results 
To explain what has led to the cost reductions and improvement of capacity factor over 
time seen in Figure 2-4, we use spatial error models to estimate the learning effects on all three 
dependent variables in two steps.20 First, we focus on internal learning from project participants’ 
own R&D and experience, and learning through their interactions. We then modify the model to 
also test for spillover effects – learning from external experience from other projects. 21 
2.5.1 Effects of internal learning and learning-by-interacting 
2.5.1.1 Empirical model 
As a first step, we estimate the impacts of turbine manufacturer’s knowledge stock, project 
developer and manufacturer’s previous project experience, and the collaboration between them on 
                                                 
20 We have also tried O&M costs (RMB/kWh) as one of our dependent variables. However, we did not find any 
significant effects of learning on O&M costs. Unlike capital costs, O&M costs are estimates of future costs. Thus an 
insignificant result for O&M costs might be a result of attenuation bias due to measurement error. 
21 While one might be concerned that the relationship between the learning variables and costs may suffer from 
simultaneity bias because cost reduction in wind power could lead to more installation or R&D, we believe it is not a 
major concern in China’s wind industry for two reasons. Most importantly, although wind power cost has decreased 
over time, it was still much higher than the cost of coal-fired electricity in China from 2002 to 2009. What actually 
incentivized most wind technology innovation and deployment in China in this period were technology-push and 
demand-pull policies aiming at creating a domestic wind industry. These government policies were mainly designed 
and implemented for political purposes. Wind farm costs were not a major determinant for how much deployment to 
subsidize or how much R&D to support (Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Li et al., 2008 & 2010). Second, in contrast to macro-
level studies that link aggregate experience to average costs, our study uses project level data.  Other studies using 
learning models at a project or firm level also treat experience as exogenous to the individual project (Nemet, 2012; 
Qiu and Anadon, 2012).   
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each of our three dependent variables. However, the unit costs or capacity factor of a wind project 
may also react to unobserved features of its neighboring projects or provinces, such as spillovers 
of omitted policies, economic and political features from neighboring provinces, or any form of 
unobserved learning among projects in close geographic proximity. Therefore, we use a spatial 
error model to capture this potential spatial dependency in the omitted variables across 
observations (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Ward and Gleditsch, 2007). The empirical 
model is:22     
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐵𝑆𝑚𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐵𝐷𝑚𝑓𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐵𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑣_𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒  + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐵𝐼 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜆𝒘𝒊 ɛ𝑖  (2) 
where Yit is either unit cost or capacity factor of project i starting from year t, LBSmft  is 
manufacturer’s knowledge stock accumulated from R&D, LBDmft_alone and LBDdev_alone  represent 
a manufacturer or developer’s project experience, excluding their shared CDM project experience, 
and LBI represents the collaborating experience between the developer and the manufacturer in 
previous CDM projects. We subtract this collaborating installation from their own cumulative 
installed capacities so as to examine the effect of learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting 
separately. 23 All the learning variables are lagged one year (t-1) to capture the knowledge stock or 
experience accumulated before the start of the current project.24 Xi  represents the control variables 
listed in Table 2-3 including province and year dummies. 
We decompose the overall error into two components: 1) a spatially uncorrelated error term 
ui, that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed; and 2) the spatial component of 
the error term ɛ. The spatial weight vector wi reflects the distance between project i and any other 
                                                 
22 While most learning models use a log-log format, so as to interpret the coefficients as learning rates, we do not 
use logs for our explanatory variables as we have many zeros when decomposing experience in the later models.  
23 In equation (2), LBDmft_alone = LBDmft – LBI, and LBDdev_alone = LBDdev – LBI.  
24 We tried various lags for different learning variables. For manufacturer’s knowledge stock, we test different lags 
(1 to 4 years) in our empirical analysis because it may take multiple years for a patent application to lead to mass 
production. However, none of the lags are significant. For industrial spillovers, we also try a two-year lag, but the 
second lag is not significant.  
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projects in our sample. More weight is placed on a nearby project than a distant project. 25 We use 
project coordinates to compute the distance between each of the two projects in our sample. The 
spatial autoregressive coefficient λ indicates the extent to which the spatial component of error 
terms ɛ are correlated with each other among observations. If λ is significantly different from zero, 
it suggests that the spatial component of the errors are correlated with other nearby projects. 
Otherwise, the model reduces to a standard linear regression model where projects are independent 
of one another. Due to the potential correlation among error terms, we use maximum likelihood 
method to estimate the spatial error models.26 
2.5.1.2 Model Results 
Table 2-5 reports the estimates of different learning effects on all three dependent variables 
using equation (2). In models (2), (4) and (6), we further include an interaction term between the 
foreign manufacturer dummy and cooperating experience between the developer and manufacturer 
to test whether collaboration with a foreign manufacturer makes a difference on project costs and 
capacity factor. The impact of our various control variables is mostly as expected. Note that while 
larger turbines improve capacity factor, installation costs also increase, so that the net effect on 
unit costs are insignificant. While there is no significant spatial dependency among the error terms 
in models (1) and (2) for unit production costs, the significance of λ in models (3) to (6) suggests 
that project capital cost per kW and capacity factor react to some unobservables in neighboring 
                                                 
25 We construct an inverse-distance spatial weight matrix to capture the proximity among all the observations (i.e. wi  
is row i from the matrix), in which weights are inversely related to the distances between projects. By convention, the 
diagonal elements of the matrix are set to zero and the row elements are normalized so that they sum to 1 (Anselin 
and Bera, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Fischer and Varga, 2003; Drukker et al., 2013). For technical details on the 
construction of the inverse-distance spatial weight matrix, see Drukker et al., 2013. 
26 We also estimate the linear models without spatial error terms by ordinary least squares. The results, shown in Table 
A2-1 and Table A2-2 in the appendix, are very consistent with the results from our spatial error models presented in 
Table 2-5 and Table 2-6.  
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projects.27 Those unobservables could be spillovers from omitted economic or political status in 
neighbouring provinces, or unobserved learning from other wind projects in close proximity.  
We observe robust learning-by-doing effects across all models in Table 2-5. Wind projects 
benefit from a project developer’s previous experience in CDM projects, which significantly 
reduces overall electricity production costs, installation costs, and increases project capacity factor. 
However, a manufacturer’s previous installation experience does not matter.  
Another robust observation is that the cooperating experience between the project 
developer and a foreign turbine manufacturer leads to the greatest cost reduction and capacity 
factor improvement. From model (1) and (3), the impacts of collaborating experience between a 
developer and the same manufacturer on the reduction of unit production cost and unit capital cost 
are much larger than the impacts of the developer’s experience alone. However, when we add the 
interaction term with foreign turbine manufactures in model (2) and (4), we find that collaboration 
with a foreign manufacturer actually generates these major cost savings. An additional 1 GW 
installed capacity by a developer with its foreign manufacturer partner drives down both unit 
production cost and unit capital cost by approximately 11%.28 Given that the average size of a 
CDM wind project is approximately 60 MW, this magnitude indicates that each additional CDM 
wind project that the developer and its foreign manufacturer partner build together decreases the 
electricity production cost and the unit capital cost by about 0.68%. Similarly, the collaboration 
between a project developer and the foreign manufacturer partner leads to the largest increase in 
capacity factor as shown in model (6).  
                                                 
27 We have also done the Moran’s I test and the Lagrange Multiplier test, which both suggest that the spatial error 
dependence is not significant in model (1) and model (2).  
28 This percentage is calculated from the coefficients on the interaction term and the cooperating experience in model 
(4). For example, for unit capital costs, exp(-0.05432-0.06694)-1=-0.1141, which indicates an 11.4% of reduction in 
unit capital cost. 
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As mentioned in 2.3, qualitative evidence from CDM project design documents suggests 
that the interactions between project developer and turbine suppliers have facilitated the absorption 
and dissemination of wind technologies. Our empirical findings above provide further evidence 
for joint learning and knowledge diffusion between developers and manufacturers during their 
CDM collaborations. For project cost reductions, learning-by-interacting may be one of the 
mechanisms. However, other possible explanations exist, such as economically reciprocal wind 
turbine purchase contracts between repeated partners or the reduction of transaction costs. 
Examining such alternative explanations would require a qualitative approach and is left for future 
research. Nonetheless, our finding that international collaboration improves capacity factors 
reinforces the LBI explanation since this improvement in wind farm productivity most likely 
results from learning, rather than from the financial benefits of a repeated relationship.29  
While previous empirical studies on European wind power over 10 to 20 years find that 
knowledge stock accumulated from country level R&D expenditure significantly reduces wind 
farm investment costs (Soderholm & Klassen, 2007; Soderholm & Sundqvist, 2007), we do not 
observe significant learning effects from R&D in turbine manufacturing on cost reduction or the 
improvement of wind farm productivity in China from 2002 to 2009. One possible explanation 
may be that most patents from Chinese turbine manufacturers, which install the majority of wind 
                                                 
29 Another alternative explanation raised by a reviewer is a selection effect that developers choose to repeatedly 
purchase from turbine manufacturers with lower costs. Our sample includes 87 developers.  Of these, we observe 53 
developers only once, and another 15 developers have four or fewer projects.  These are mostly new developers 
appearing in the later years of our sample. These developers partner with a range of manufacturers. We compared the 
mean capital cost per kW between these selected manufacturers with the rest of the projects in each year. There is no 
significant difference between the two groups for each year, suggesting that repeated collaborations are not the result 
of successful selection leading to lower costs.  The other 19 developers have a diverse range of partnerships.  They 
keep previous partnerships while reaching out to new manufacturers in different projects that begin in later years. We 
do not see evidence that they only collaborate with one or two manufacturers, or that the numbers of partners have 
declined over time as they develop a special relationship with one or two particular manufacturers that may have lower 
costs. Again, comparing the means of each group, we do not see differences in the mean unit capital costs between 
manufacturers that collaborate with these developers in multiple projects and the other manufacturers in the same year.  
Thus, we do not believe that selection effects drive the results.  
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capacities in our sample, are not key technologies that lead to significant improvement in wind 
farm productivity.  
In addition to learning effects, the two production-oriented policy instruments also have 
significant impacts. Across all models, we observe that higher expected feed-in-tariffs result in 
higher project costs and lower capacity factor. This interesting finding indicates that FIT, as a 
guaranteed cost-based price that project developers expect to get for a long term, can encourage 
investment in wind projects with higher financial or technical barriers in China. These projects 
with low profit margins may not have been developed without subsidies. Unlike FIT, the expected 
CER price from CDM, is significant in only some models. One reason may be that CER price is 
determined in the international carbon trading market, which is not necessarily correlated with a 
single project’s cost. Moreover, whether it can become a continuous source of revenue is uncertain 
at the starting date of a project because the project might get rejected by CDM and the issuance of 
CERs requires further validation in the future.  
2.5.2 Spillover effects 
In addition to the internal learning and learning between participants within a wind project, 
spillovers from the installation and operational experience of other projects are also a very 
important channel of learning in the wind industry (Nemet, 2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012).  Such 
spillovers, if present, provide additional justification for the government to subsidy the adoption 
of wind technology. To test for possible spillovers, we must modify equation (2), as the sum of 
individual and collaborative experience, combined with other industry spillovers, equals total 
industry experience in any given year.30 To avoid multicollinearity between these experience 
                                                 
30 More formally, the sum of industrial spillover from other projects and the experience accumulated within the 
manufacturer and developer including their shared experience is equal to total industrial experience, which only varies 
across time. LBDmft_alone + LBDdev_alone + LBI + Industry_spillover = (LBDmft – LBI) + (LBDdev – LBI) + LBI + 
(Industry_experience – LBDdev – LBDmft + LBI) = Industry_experience. 
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variables and the year fixed effect, we modify equation (2) by removing collaborative experience 
to allow the introduction of spillovers to the model. Instead, we include collaborative experience 
in both the manufacturer’s and the developer’s internal experience variable:  
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐵𝑆𝑚𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐵𝐷𝑚𝑓𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐿𝐵𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝒘𝒊 ɛ𝑖  (3)  
Table 2-6 shows the regression results for equation (3). Again, only models for unit capital 
cost and capacity factor have spatial dependency in error terms. The impacts of policies and other 
control variables are similar to the results for internal learning and learning-by-interacting in the 
previous section. Across all models, the learning-by-doing effects from a project developer’s 
experience are consistently significant. The LBD impacts on unit production cost and unit capital 
cost are close to the impacts of cooperating experience on these two dependent variables in Table 
2-5, since we add the LBI experience back to the internal experience of the project developer. We 
also observe that the manufacturer’s experience (including cooperating experience with the 
developer) significantly reduces unit capital costs in model (5).  
While we find evidence of industry-level spillovers on unit capital cost in model (2), 
experience from other projects in the industry does not have significant effects on unit production 
cost or project capacity factor. This result may reflect the nature of different learning systems. The 
choices regarding siting, equipment selection, and construction of a wind project seem to be more 
visible than the daily choices on wind farm operation (Nemet, 2012). Particularly, the public nature 
of CDM project design documents helps disseminate knowledge about siting and equipment 
selection. In addition, the result may also reflect the current challenge for wind power generation 
in China. Although there has been rapid growth in wind capacity since 2005, the existing installed 
capacity has either been held up for grid-connection or has been utilized at a very low rate due to 
the inadequacy of the grid capacity (Yang et al., 2012). As a result, wind project developers may 
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learn more about installation and construction from industry-wide experience than wind farm 
operation and power generation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Using CDM wind projects that started between 2002 and 2009 in China, we examine the 
effects of different channels of learning – learning through R&D in wind turbine manufacturing, 
learning from a firm’s previous wind project experience, learning from the experience of other 
firms, and learning through collaboration between turbine manufacturer and project developer—
on technological change in China’s wind industry. We consider the impacts of learning on wind 
power production costs, as well as on two components – wind farm installation costs and capacity 
factor.  
2.6.1  Learning-by-doing, spillovers and demand-pull policy design  
 Consistent with previous research on learning curve in wind power (Qiu and Anadon, 2012; 
Nemet, 2012), we find learning-by-doing effects for wind project developers in China, as well as 
spillovers from industry-wide experience. While wind project developers benefit from their past 
internal experience on both wind farm installation and wind power generation, inter-firm spillovers 
only appear for wind farm installation rather than wind power production. This may be a result of 
the low utilization of the existing installed capacities in China (Yang et al., 2012). Still, the 
evidence of inter-firm spillovers on wind farm installation justifies the need for demand-pull 
subsidies in the development of wind industry in China, such as feed-in tariffs and CDM revenues. 
These demand-pull subsidies can offset private incentives to wait and free-ride on the learning 
benefits from wind project investments by other developers and turbine manufacturers.  
However, it is worth noting that characteristics of these demand-pull policies may affect 
the investment choice in different wind projects. As a long-term, guaranteed cost-based subsidy, 
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expected feed-in tariffs encourage investment in more marginal sites that have higher technical 
barriers and/or financial barriers. Those sites could be in the regions with less favorable wind 
resource so that capacity factors are lower, or near big cities so that the capital costs are high.  In 
contrast, the revenue from CDM has more uncertainty, such as the probability of project rejection, 
the level of CER price, and the continuity of CDM itself. Hence, the impact of the expected CER 
price on project choice is not very clear. 
2.6.2 Learning-by-interacting and international collaboration regimes  
Most importantly, our paper is the first to empirically test and provide evidence for 
learning-by-interacting effects in wind power. We find that previous collaborating experience 
between a project developer and a foreign turbine manufacturer leads to the greatest reduction in 
project costs and improvement of productivity. While we cannot rule out that reductions of 
transaction costs or discounts that a foreign turbine manufacturer gives to trusted partner 
developers play a role in cost reduction, we do believe that our results provide evidence that joint 
learning between partners during their interactions on wind farm installation and operation occurs. 
In particular, we not only observe cost savings but also improvements of productivity (as measured 
using capacity factor) through international collaboration between project developers and foreign 
manufacturers. Such technical improvement should not simply be a result of lower transaction 
costs or favorable pricing decisions. Nonetheless, more research, particularly of a qualitative 
nature, is necessary to definitely separate this learning-by-interacting effect from other possible 
mechanisms in these international collaborations that drive down the project costs.  
Since one goal of CDM is to enable technology transfer from developed countries to project 
hosting countries and the subsequent diffusion of climate-friendly technologies in these countries, 
the learning-by-interacting effects that we find in CDM wind projects in China suggest that the 
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CDM can achieve this goal by encouraging collaboration between project developers in hosting 
country and foreign turbine manufacturers. In addition to the physical transfer of wind power 
equipment, their repeated collaboration on multiple CDM projects also allows transfer of codified 
knowledge and knowhow on wind farm installation and operation. While there is much uncertainty 
about the future of CDM in the next round of global climate negotiations, our results suggest that 
the Chinese government or governments in other CDM project hosting countries should make use 
of alternative international climate mitigation partnerships, or implement domestic policies that 
forge the collaboration between domestic wind developers and foreign manufacturers to further 
facilitate cost reductions in wind power.  
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Table 2-1 Matrix of China’s Wind Technology Policy Tools 
 Domestic  International  
Technology-
push 
- National basic research program (973 Program, 1997) 
- National high-tech R&D program (863 Program, 
1986) 
- National key technology R&D program (TKPs, 1982)  
Foreign R&D funds for 
turbine manufacturing 
Demand-pull  Production incentives (FITs/subsidies): 
- National wind  concession programs (2003-2008) 
- Power surcharge for wind power (2006) 
- NDRC Notice on policy to improve grid-connected 
power pricing for wind power generation (2009) 
 
Installation (capital) incentives: 
- The wind installation targets in the Medium and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy 
in China (2007 & 2008) 
- Relief of VAT and import tax for wind turbines 
(2008)  
-   Domestic content requirements for wind turbines 
(2005-2009)  
Production incentive: 
The Clean Development  
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Table 2-2  Comparison between the Winning Prices of the National Concession Program 
and the Unit Costs of CDM Wind Projects 
 




Average unit costs of 
CDM projects 
Difference 
Gansu 2005 0.4616 0.5615 22% 
 2007 0.4897 0.4666 -5% 
Guangdong 2003 0.5105 0.4678 -8% 
Heibei 2006 0.4932 0.5268 7% 
 2007 0.5183 0.5306 2% 
Inner Mongolia 2004 0.3890 0.4553 17% 
 2006 0.4138 0.4497 9% 
 2007 0.4655 0.4676 0.5% 
Jiangsu 2003 0.4445 NA NA 
 2004 0.5285 0.5157 -2% 
 2005 0.4877 0.5267 8% 
Jilin 2004 0.5183 0.636 23% 
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Table 2-3  Explanatory Variables in the Empirical Model 
Variables Description 
𝑳𝑩𝑺𝒎𝒇𝒕  Manufacturer’s knowledge stock: Cumulative patents related to wind power 
that the manufacturer has in year t-1. 
𝑳𝑩𝑫𝒎𝒇𝒕  Experience from manufacturer: Manufacturer’s cumulative installed 
capacities in year t-1. (GW) 
𝑳𝑩𝑫𝒅𝒆𝒗 Experience from project developer in CDM projects: Project developer’s 
cumulative installed capacities in CDM projects in year t-1.  (GW) 
LBI Collaborative experience between project developer and manufacturer: 
Cumulative capacities installed by this developer and the same manufacturer in 
previous CDM projects in year t-1.  (GW) 
Industry_experience Experience from the whole industry: Cumulative installed capacities of the 
whole industry in year t-1.  (GW) 
Control Variables  
𝑻𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒆_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊 The average size of wind turbines of project i (= project size/numbers of 
turbines). 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊 The installed capacity of project i.  
𝑾𝟏𝒊,𝑾𝟐𝒊,𝑾𝟑𝒊,W4i Binary variables representing four wind resource categories specified by the 
benchmark FITs for wind power in China (NDRC, 2009). W1i indicates if 
project i is located in the best wind quality region while W4i indicates if project 
i is in the region with the least wind resources. 
Foreign_mft Binary variable indicating whether the manufacturer in project i is a foreign 
firm. 
SOE_dev Binary variable indicating whether the project developer in project i is a state-
owned enterprise regulated and supervised by the central government.  
LSOE_dev Binary variable indicating whether the project developer in project i is a state-
owned enterprise regulated and supervised by the local government.  
Private_dev  Binary variable indicating whether the project developer in project i is a 
private firm. 
FIT Feed-in-tariff (tax is not included) that project i is expected to get from the 
government. (2005 RMB/kWh) 
CER_price Expected CER price that project i will get paid from the CDM carbon trade. 
(2005 RMB/kg CO2) 
Electricity_consumption Annual electricity consumption in the province where project i is located. 
(TWh) 
Coal_consumption Annual coal consumption in the province where project i is located. (million 
tons) 
Gas_consumption Annual natural gas consumption in the province where project i is located.    
(km3) 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 Province dummies, control for regional time-invariant heterogeneity. 
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 Start year dummies, control for national policies, input prices, national and 
global technological change, and other omitted variables changing over time. 
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Table 2-4  Summary Statistics 
Sample Size: N=486 
 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Median Max Min 
Unit cost  (2005 RMB/kWh) 0.523 0.076 0.513 1.007 0.335 
Unit capital cost (2005 RMB/kW) 8906.85 1096.78 8838.04 21055.1 6444.57 
Capacity factor 0.252 0.028 0.252 0.339 0.144 
Manufacturer's knowledge stock (Decay 
rate = 0.15)  
27.741 61.439 6.529 363.902 0 
Manufacturer's cumulative installed 
capacity (GW) 
0.702 0.779 0.387 2.621 0 
Developer's cumulative installed capacity 
in CDM projects (GW) 
0.747 0.970 0.380 3.338 0 
Cooperating installed capacity in CDM 
projects (GW) 
0.127 0.218 0.026 0.938 0 
Industrial level cumulative installed 
capacity (GW) 
6.723 4.301 6.029 12.173 0.547 
Average turbine size (MW) 1.347 0.375 1.50 3.00 0.60 
CDM project size (MW) 59.324 48.944 49.50 400.50 9.35 
Foreign manufacturer 0.251 0.434 0 1 0 
Central SOE developer 0.704 0.457 1 1 0 
Local SOE developer 0.113 0.317 0 1 0 
Private developer 0.183 0.387 0 1 0 
Wind category 1 0.198 0.399 0 1 0 
Wind category 2 0.292 0.455 0 1 0 
Wind category 3 0.123 0.329 0 1 0 
Wind category 4 0.387 0.488 0 1 0 
Expected feed-in tariff (2005 RMB/kWh) 0.476 0.078 0.459 0.988 0.171 
Expected CER price (2005 RMB/kg CO2) 0.095 0.014 0.094 0.145 0.049 
Electricity demand (TWh) 125.880 71.727 122.057 350.678 11.325 
Coal consumption(million tons) 159.298 82.257 171.165 343.900 4.260 
Natural gas consumption( km3) 2.178 1.353 1.809 6.984 0.048 
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Table 2-5  Effects of Internal Learning and Learning-by-interacting 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; R2 for spatial error model is pseudo-R2; Spatial error model is 
estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Learning Variables       
Knowledge stock of  -0.00012 -0.00011 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
manufacturer (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
Manufacturer’s experience  -0.00103 -0.00401 -0.00075 -0.00246 0.00646 0.00840 
alone (GW) (0.00666) (0.00666) (0.00691) (0.00695) (0.00578) (0.00583) 
Developer’s experience in  -0.02785*** -0.02628*** -0.01875*** -0.01767*** 0.01689*** 0.01601*** 
CDM projects alone (GW) (0.00654) (0.00648) (0.00672) (0.00672) (0.00572) (0.00571) 
Cooperating experience in  -0.05463** -0.01117 -0.08050*** -0.05432** -0.01042 -0.03604 
CDM (GW) (0.02217) (0.02591) (0.02280) (0.02687) (0.01956) (0.02311) 
Foreign manufacturer*  -0.11125***  -0.06694*  0.06436** 
Cooperating experience  (0.03545)  (0.03677)  (0.03124) 
Control Variables       
Expected feed-in tariff  0.55256*** 0.54484*** 0.58259*** 0.57548*** -0.29751*** -0.29404*** 
(RMB/kWh) (0.08574) (0.08479) (0.08858) (0.08838) (0.07342) (0.07315) 
Expected CER price 0.67860** 0.64565** 0.35974 0.34155 -0.33657 -0.31463 
(RMB/kg CO2) (0.27150) (0.26855) (0.27995) (0.27923) (0.23823) (0.23742) 
Turbine size (MW) 0.00953 0.00384 0.09882*** 0.09513*** 0.06795*** 0.07175*** 
 (0.01128) (0.01132) (0.01164) (0.01177) (0.00995) (0.01007) 
Project size  (MW) -0.00025*** -0.00026*** -0.00032*** -0.00032*** 0.00012 0.00012 
 (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
Wind category 1 -0.12083*** -0.13019*** -0.05157* -0.05676* 0.08316*** 0.08943*** 
 (0.03198) (0.03138) (0.03113) (0.03117) (0.03181) (0.03174) 
Wind category 2 -0.07770** -0.08429*** -0.05755* -0.06046** 0.05165* 0.05703* 
 (0.03071) (0.03002) (0.02977) (0.02972) (0.03067) (0.03053) 
Wind category 3 -0.02221 -0.02950 -0.01501 -0.01872 -0.01226 -0.00853 
 (0.02277) (0.02247) (0.02241) (0.02244) (0.02134) (0.02129) 
Foreign manufacturer 0.01288 0.02882** 0.04780*** 0.05823*** 0.04449*** 0.03510*** 
 (0.01287) (0.01371) (0.01305) (0.01419) (0.01097) (0.01183) 
Central SOE developer -0.00476 -0.00932 0.00147 -0.00119 -0.00641 -0.00372 
 (0.01142) (0.01138) (0.01181) (0.01187) (0.01013) (0.01018) 
Local SOE developer 0.02535 0.02297 0.00811 0.00671 -0.02566* -0.02443* 
 (0.01564) (0.01547) (0.01606) (0.01603) (0.01383) (0.01378) 
Electricity demand  0.00020 0.00027 0.00103 0.00106 0.00118** 0.00116** 
(TWh) (0.00066) (0.00066) (0.00069) (0.00068) (0.00058) (0.00057) 
Coal consumption -0.00008 -0.00013 -0.00066 -0.00070* -0.00059* -0.00056 
(million tons) (0.00041) (0.00040) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00035) (0.00035) 
Natural gas consumption 0.00394 0.00163 -0.02406** -0.02524** -0.01731* -0.01621* 
( km3) (0.01066) (0.01058) (0.01110) (0.01108) (0.00929) (0.00926) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial autoregressive  0.18389 0.14811 0.40405*** 0.42855*** 0.52181*** 0.51384*** 
coefficient λ (0.13030) (0.13385) (0.14891) (0.10945) (0.10275) (0.10431) 
obs 486 486 486 486 486 486 
R-Squared 0.723 0.724 0.563 0.568 0.644 0.647 
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Table 2-6  Spillover Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables 
(in logs) 
Unit cost Capital/kW Capacity factor 
Learning Variables    
knowledge stock of  -0.00012 0.00003 0.00002 
manufacturer (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00007) 
Manufacturer’ experience  -0.02679 -0.06513** 0.00228 
(GW) (0.02540) (0.02626) (0.00493) 
Developer’s experience in  -0.05360** -0.08328*** 0.01150*** 
CDM projects (GW) (0.02385) (0.02466) (0.00418) 
Spillover from the  -0.02575 -0.06467** -0.00088 
industry (GW) (0.02722) (0.02815) (0.00128) 
Control Variables    
Feed-in-tariff after tax  0.55256*** 0.57085*** -0.30910*** 
(RMB/kWh) (0.08577) (0.08863) (0.07221) 
Expected CER price 0.67860** 0.37544 -0.34554 
(RMB/kg CO2) (0.27150) (0.28118) (0.23493) 
Turbine size (MW) 0.00953 0.10354*** 0.06790*** 
 (0.01128) (0.01160) (0.00984) 
Project size (MW) -0.00025*** -0.00034*** 0.00012 
 (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00008) 
Wind category 1 -0.12083*** -0.06278* 0.08483*** 
 (0.03198) (0.03319) (0.03180) 
Wind category 2 -0.07770** -0.06756** 0.05219* 
 (0.03071) (0.03179) (0.03066) 
Wind category 3 -0.02221 -0.02078 -0.00976 
 (0.02277) (0.02322) (0.02129) 
Foreign manufacturer 0.01288 0.04488*** 0.04064*** 
 (0.01287) (0.01320) (0.01038) 
Central SOE developer -0.00476 -0.00031 -0.00778 
 (0.01143) (0.01192) (0.01011) 
Local SOE developer 0.02535 0.00768 -0.02565* 
 (0.01564) (0.01617) (0.01378) 
Electricity demand  0.00020 0.00104 0.00105** 
(TWh) (0.00066) (0.00069) (0.00044) 
Coal consumption -0.00008 -0.00058 -0.00052* 
(million tons) (0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00027) 
Natural gas consumption 0.00394 -0.02597** -0.01612* 
( km3) (0.01066) (0.01104) (0.00909) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Spatial autoregressive  0.18389 0.24802* 0.51975*** 
coefficient 𝜌 (0.13035) (0.13500) (0.10183) 
Observations 486 486 486 
R-squared 0.710 0.543 0.640 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; R2 for spatial error model is pseudo- R2; Spatial error model is estimated by 
the maximum likelihood method. 
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Notes: Annual total installed capacity data comes from the CWEA’s annual reports on China’s wind power. CDM 
installed capacity data is collected from the CDM Pipeline and CDM project design documents. Due to the CDM 
registration process, the incremental installed capacity from CDM projects in 2009 is incomplete. Thus, the CDM 
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1) The left axis indicates the value for capital costs (RMB/kW) and the right axis indicates the value for unit 
cost (RMB/kWh) and capacity factor.  
2) Due to missing data in project design documents, we cannot calculate the unit costs for CDM projects that 
started from 2002.  
 
  
2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Capital costs (RMB/kW) 9586.4 8862.9 9423.0 9355.6 8985.7 8707.2 8878.5
Unit cost (RMB/kWh) 0.468 0.585 0.557 0.531 0.509 0.514
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Appendix 
Table A2-1 OLS Estimates for Internal Learning and Learning-by-interacting  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Learning Variables       
Knowledge stock of  -0.00010 -0.00010 0.00004 0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00002 
manufacturer (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
Manufacturer’s experience  -0.00096 -0.00388 -0.00076 -0.00241 0.00668 0.00851 
alone (GW) (0.00644) (0.00646) (0.00680) (0.00684) (0.00578) (0.00576) 
Developer’s experience in  -0.02867*** -0.02681*** -0.01872** -0.01768** 0.01909*** 0.01792*** 
CDM projects alone (GW) (0.00669) (0.00654) (0.00748) (0.00749) (0.00603) (0.00595) 
Cooperating experience in  -0.05528*** -0.01077 -0.08367*** -0.05850** -0.00307 -0.03116 
CDM (GW) (0.01966) (0.02339) (0.02573) (0.02944) (0.02055) (0.02304) 
Foreign manufacturer*  -0.11437***  -0.06467  0.07216** 
Cooperating experience  (0.03404)  (0.04210)  (0.03140) 
Control Variables       
Expected feed-in tariff  0.56499** 0.55252** 0.57801*** 0.57096*** -0.29495** -0.28708** 
(RMB/kWh) (0.24903) (0.24718) (0.14929) (0.15264) (0.13206) (0.13224) 
Expected CER price 0.67358** 0.64272** 0.36302 0.34557 -0.22665 -0.20718 
(RMB/kg CO2) (0.29067) (0.29223) (0.30143) (0.30224) (0.26008) (0.26028) 
Turbine size (MW) 0.01129 0.00534 0.10416*** 0.10080*** 0.06540*** 0.06915*** 
 (0.01668) (0.01735) (0.01395) (0.01421) (0.01101) (0.01101) 
Project size  (MW) -0.00026** -0.00027** -0.00033** -0.00034** 0.00013* 0.00013* 
 (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
Wind category 1 -0.12125*** -0.13046*** -0.05682** -0.06203** 0.10843*** 0.11424*** 
 (0.02521) (0.02572) (0.02723) (0.02836) (0.03427) (0.03379) 
Wind category 2 -0.08031*** -0.08558*** -0.06188** -0.06486** 0.07876** 0.08209** 
 (0.02102) (0.02071) (0.02478) (0.02566) (0.03316) (0.03243) 
Wind category 3 -0.02658* -0.03317** -0.01862 -0.02234 -0.00659 -0.00243 
 (0.01552) (0.01554) (0.01856) (0.01897) (0.01838) (0.01823) 
Foreign manufacturer 0.00846 0.02589* 0.04202*** 0.05188*** 0.04858*** 0.03758*** 
 (0.01339) (0.01555) (0.01440) (0.01516) (0.01213) (0.01362) 
Central SOE developer -0.00410 -0.00888 -0.00210 -0.00481 -0.01227 -0.00925 
 (0.01089) (0.01070) (0.01308) (0.01303) (0.01057) (0.01059) 
Local SOE developer 0.02496 0.02257 0.00811 0.00675 -0.02890 -0.02739 
 (0.02008) (0.01965) (0.01948) (0.01917) (0.01855) (0.01884) 
Electricity demand  0.00028 0.00034 0.00109 0.00113 0.00141** 0.00137** 
(TWh) (0.00067) (0.00067) (0.00078) (0.00079) (0.00067) (0.00066) 
Coal consumption -0.00003 -0.00010 -0.00056 -0.00060 -0.00069 -0.00065 
(million tons) (0.00039) (0.00040) (0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00042) (0.00042) 
Natural gas consumption 0.00299 0.00082 -0.02636** -0.02759** -0.02147 -0.02010 
( km3) (0.01495) (0.01480) (0.01240) (0.01243) (0.01475) (0.01465) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
obs 486 486 486 486 486 486 
R-Squared 0.708 0.715 0.537 0.540 0.631 0.636 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables 
(in logs) 
Unit cost Capital/kW Capacity factor 
Learning Variables    
knowledge stock of  -0.00010 0.00004 0.00001 
manufacturer (0.00007) (0.00012) (0.00007) 
Manufacturer’ experience  -0.02661 -0.06494 0.00376 
(GW) (0.02354) (0.04911) (0.00517) 
Developer’s experience in  -0.05432** -0.08291*** 0.01526*** 
CDM projects (GW) (0.02180) (0.02727) (0.00493) 
Spillover from the  -0.02565 -0.06418** 0.00031 
industry (GW) (0.02584) (0.03077) (0.00306) 
Control Variables    
Feed-in-tariff after tax  0.56499** 0.57801*** -0.30427** 
(RMB/kWh) (0.24903) (0.14929) (0.13199) 
Expected CER price 0.67358** 0.36302 -0.21541 
(RMB/kg CO2) (0.29067) (0.30143) (0.26223) 
Turbine size (MW) 0.01129 0.10416*** 0.06530*** 
 (0.01668) (0.01395) (0.01106) 
Project size (MW) -0.00026** -0.00033** 0.00013 
 (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00008) 
Wind category 1 -0.12125*** -0.05682** 0.10953*** 
 (0.02521) (0.02723) (0.03270) 
Wind category 2 -0.08031*** -0.06188** 0.07895** 
 (0.02102) (0.02478) (0.03176) 
Wind category 3 -0.02658* -0.01862 -0.00578 
 (0.01552) (0.01856) (0.01762) 
Foreign manufacturer 0.00846 0.04202*** 0.04481*** 
 (0.01339) (0.01440) (0.01150) 
Central SOE developer -0.00410 -0.00210 -0.01392 
 (0.01089) (0.01308) (0.01037) 
Local SOE developer 0.02496 0.00811 -0.02916 
 (0.02008) (0.01948) (0.01835) 
Electricity demand  0.00028 0.00109 0.00121** 
(TWh) (0.00067) (0.00078) (0.00053) 
Coal consumption -0.00003 -0.00056 -0.00054* 
(million tons) (0.00039) (0.00043) (0.00031) 
Natural gas consumption 0.00299 -0.02636** -0.01956 
( km3) (0.01495) (0.01240) (0.01378) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 486 486 486 
R-squared 0.708 0.537 0.629 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3:  Explaining Technological Change in the US Wind Industry: 
Energy Policies, Technological Learning, and Collaboration
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3.1 Introduction  
As the world’s major energy consumer and carbon dioxide emitter, the United States is 
striving to increase the share of renewable energy in its electricity supply so as to address climate 
change and energy security concerns. Among all renewable energy sources, wind energy has great 
potential to provide a significant share of electricity generation. During the last two decades, US 
has experienced tremendous technological change in wind power. By the end of 2013, cumulative 
wind installed capacity has reached 74,472 MW, which is almost 30 times of the total installed 
capacity in 2000. With the development of larger wind turbines and better siting technologies, and 
improvement in interconnecting renewable energy to the grid, productivity of most wind projects 
in late 2000s has become 20% - 60% greater than the productivity of wind projects before 1998 
(AWEA, 2012; Wiser and Bonlinger, 2012). This immense progress is driven by various policy 
instruments that both federal government and state governments have implemented to incentivize 
investment in wind energy. Understanding how these energy policies affect different actors in the 
wind power sector to develop and diffuse wind energy is important for future renewable energy 
policy design.  
In this paper, I use utility-scale wind farms in US over the period 2001-2012 to examine 
what has led to technological change in the US wind industry, measured as productivity 
improvement of wind power. I analyze this research question from a technological learning 
perspective (Junginger et al., 2005), which focuses on how knowledge related to wind power is 
acquired and diffused among different participants in the wind industry, including wind turbine 
manufacturers, wind farm operators, transmission system owners, and system operators,31 given 
                                                 
31 In this paper, I use the definition from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Transmission system 
owners are utilities that own the transmission facilities to which each wind farm is interconnected. Transmission 
system is operated by its owner in regions that are not governed by independent system operators or regional 
transmission organizations (ISO/RTOs). Transmission system operator and transmission system owner are separate 
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the heterogeneous institutional settings across regions. Specifically, I ask whether wind farm 
productivity increases after a project developer or a wind turbine manufacturer has installed more 
wind farms (learning-by-doing). I also test whether project developers or turbine manufacturers 
learn from the installation and operation of other similar projects (spillover effect). Moreover, I 
test if productivity increases after repeated collaboration among project participants on their 
previous wind projects (learning-by-interacting), especially when the transmission network they 
are involved in is coordinated at regional level by an independent system operator. In addition, I 
also test other drivers of technological change, such as R&D in wind turbine manufacturing 
(learning-by-searching). 
This paper has policy implications for energy technology policymakers and electricity 
market regulators in US. Focusing on the roles of various actors engaged in wind power, this paper 
can increase understanding of the learning process in the US wind industry, and help policy-makers 
better target policies to different learning channels so as to improve the performance of wind power 
and make it more competitive to fossil fuel in the energy market.  First, the evidence of knowledge 
spillovers from other wind projects justifies the subsidies to wind farm operators, such as 
production tax credit or other forms of financial incentives, so as to offset private incentives to 
wait and free-ride on the learning benefits from investments by other wind project owners and 
turbine manufacturers. Consequently, these subsidies may encourage more wind power generation, 
and further increase wind farm productivity over time through learning-by-doing. Moreover, this 
paper addresses the emerging challenge of integrating variable renewable energy (MIT, 2011; 
Klass and Wilson, 2012; Wiser and Bonlinger, 2011 & 2012) by highlighting the importance of 
learning-by-interacting through regional collaboration on transmission. Beyond a bilateral 
                                                 
agencies in ISO/RTO-governed regions. In these regions, the transmission system is operated by an ISO/RTO. 
Section 2 introduces more details about ISO/RTOs.   
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collaboration between a wind farm operator and the owner of the transmission system that this 
wind farm is interconnected to, a regional transmission network, coordinated by an independent 
system optimizing agency, can further improve wind power interconnection and productivity due 
to its capability of mobilizing and integrating resources from different electricity market 
participants at regional level.  
In addition to its policy implications, this paper also contributes to studies on renewable 
energy policies and technological learning literature. Most existing empirical studies on US 
renewable energy polices focus on testing whether a particular state renewable energy policy has 
led to the diffusion of wind power in the form of installed capacity or share of electricity generation 
from renewable (Adelaja and Hailu, 2007; Menz and Vachon, 2006; Carley, 2009; Yin and Powers, 
2010; Hitaj, 2013). The only one that examines the impacts of renewable energy polices on 
technological change of wind power is the work of Nemet (2012), which only looks at the learning-
by-doing effect and knowledge spillovers in wind projects within California. With a more 
representative sample of wind projects in US, this paper provides a cross-state analysis and 
examines the impacts of multiple learning channels on technological change in wind power. Apart 
from policy incentives for renewable energy adoption, integrating wind power to the transmission 
grid is also a key issue for improving wind project productivity. Previous literature on the impacts 
of transmission policies for integrating the renewables is mostly qualitative (Borenstein & 
Bushnell, 2015; Klass & Wilson, 2012; MIT, 2011; Wiser & Bonlinger, 2011 & 2012). This paper 
is the first empirical analysis on the impacts of transmission network structure on wind farm 
productivity, and connects this policy issue with network governance. Moreover, this paper adds 
to technological learning literature by incorporating collaboration theories to explain the learning 
process and providing the first empirical evidence for a learning-by-interacting effect in the US 
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wind industry. Built on existing literature that tests different learning effects in wind industry 
(Junginger et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2006; Nemet, 2006 & 2012; Soderholm & Klassen, 2007; 
Soderholm & Sundqvist, 2007; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013; Tang and Popp, 2016), this 
paper highlights the learning through collaboration among participants in a wind project, and 
through regional collaboration that facilitates knowledge exchange among a particular wind farm 
operator, other generators, transmission system operators, and load serving entities participating 
in the regional electricity market.   
This paper proceeds with a review of institutional context for the wind power sector in the 
US. Section 3.3 provides the theoretical framework that I use to analyze technological learning in 
wind industry and presents my hypotheses. Section 3.4 discusses the data and measurements for 
key variables. Section 3.5 and section 3.6 analyze the empirical results and summarize the main 
conclusions respectively. 
3.2 Institutional Context for Wind Power Development in US 
3.2.1 Electric power system and the wind industry in US 
The wind power industry is embedded in the sophisticated institutions of the US electric 
power system. As depicted in Figure 3-1, the key actors of the industry includes: 1) wind 
equipment manufacturers, which conduct research and development to advance wind technologies, 
and produce wind turbines to generate wind power; 2) wind power generators that that convert 
natural wind power into electric power, which consists of public or investor-owned utilities, and 
independent power producers; 3) transmission and distribution system owners/operators, which 
deliver electric energy from wind generators to customers. Except for wind equipment 
manufacturing sector where production is global, the other parts of the industry are organized and 
operated in the US electricity market.   
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The organization of today’s electricity market is very heterogeneous across different 
regions in US. Some regions keep the vertically integrated utility model, where a utility operates 
as a monopoly in its serving area to handles all parts of the electric power system from power 
generation to transmission and distribution. These monopolies are regulated by state and federal 
governments to ensure they keep prices reasonable for their customers. Other regions, in 
compliance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)’s deregulation orders32that 
promoted competition in the electricity wholesale market in 1996, are providing electricity services 
through more competitive markets by involving independent power producers and independent 
regional transmission system operators (MIT, 2011; Aggarwal and Harvey, 2013). The different 
features of the transmission systems between these two market structures will be described in 
details in 3.2.3. 
3.2.2 State renewable energy policies and the development of wind power in US 
In the absence of comprehensive federal policies to reduce carbon emissions and promote 
renewable energy deployment, state governments have taken initiative to use a variety of policy 
instruments to incentivize investments in renewable energy (Rabe, 2008). The economic rationale 
of these policies is to address the two market failures that affect the innovation and diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies – non-priced environmental damages caused by fossil fuel energy 
and under-investment in new technologies due to knowledge spillovers (Jaffe et al., 2005). As for 
wind power, the negative externalities of fossil fuel power are not included in energy prices so that 
wind power is currently more expensive than electricity generated from coal and natural gas. 
Moreover, private firms do not consider the potential social benefits from knowledge spillovers 
when investing in wind technology, leading to underinvestment. Thus, policy tools are often 
                                                 
32 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is an independent agency that regulates the interstate 
transmission and wholesale sales of electricity, natural gas, and oil. For details about FERC’s deregulation orders, 
see FERC Order 888 and 889.  
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needed to facilitate the deployment of wind energy and to induce technological change in wind 
power.  
State renewable energy policies, such as sales tax credits, corporate tax credits, production 
tax credits and renewable portfolio standards (RPS), give incentives for adoption of wind energy, 
and at the same time, serves as demand-pull policies that drive wind technology innovation in the 
manufacturing sector by creating demand for emerging wind technologies (Nemet, 2009).  
Based on previous studies on state renewable energy policies, I classify different state level 
renewable energy policies into three categories according to the incentives they provide (see Table 
3-1). The first type is the general policy support for the development of renewable energy, such as 
public benefits funds that some states reserve to administrate different renewable energy programs.  
The second type of policies promotes electricity production from renewables, which include 
quantity-based policy tools, and price-based policy instruments. One of the most prevalent 
quantity-based policies that many states have implemented is the Renewables Portfolio Standards, 
which usually sets a target share for electricity generated from renewable sources in a state’s total 
electricity supply. The RPS programs have been empirically proved to encourage renewable 
generation and investment in renewable energy, particularly wind energy (Carley, 2009; Yin and 
Powers, 2010). The price-based policies usually pay a renewable power generator a certain amount 
of financial incentives based on the number of kWh it produces, such as the production tax credits, 
and feed-in tariffs ($/kWh).  
The third category is the capital cost reduction incentives, which includes tax exemptions 
for sales tax, or property tax for renewable energy equipment purchase, such as purchasing wind 
turbines, solar PVs. This type of financial support will incentivize power generators to increase 
their renewable capacity installation. However, previous studies have found evidence that the 
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production based incentives encourage more investment in wind and increase the performance of 
wind farms rather than the cost reduction incentives (Nemet, 2012; Hitaj, 2013). 
3.2.3 Regional collaboration on integrating wind power 
In addition to state level policies that incentivize the development and generation of wind 
power, integrating wind energy into the transmission system is also a key factor that affects the 
productivity of wind farms. Wind energy is often referred to as “variable energy resource” because 
it is intermittent and the variability of wind generation is subjected to limited control of wind farm 
owners. High penetration of wind energy in electric power system will present uncertainty to the 
grid and increase transmission costs. To integrate wind power into the grid, the power system must 
have enough resilience from interconnections, demand response, storage, and backup supply to 
maintain its reliability, which usually requires collaboration among various generators, 
transmission/distribution system, and customers within a state, or sometimes across states (MIT, 
2011; Klass and Wilson, 2012) 
Following the FERC’s deregulation orders that promoted competition in the electricity 
wholesale market through opening the access of transmission services and real-time information 
networks, 33  seven Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations 
(ISO/RTOs) were created among partnered power generators, transmission system owners and 
utilities in 2000s to coordinate transmission and to organize the wholesale electricity sales at 
regional level. These organizations are set up as user-supported and interests-neutral non-profit 
companies overseen by FERC, which do not have any generation and transmission assets, or retail 
consumers. Their responsibility is to approve or set production schedules of power plants within 
their jurisdictional regions, and operates the real-time balancing markets by adjusting supply in 
                                                 
33 See FERC Order 888, 889 and 2000. 
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response to the demand. While the traditional vertically integrated utility model is still dominant 
in the Southeast, organized wholesale market operated by ISOs or RTOs now serves two thirds of 
the electricity demand in US (MIT, 2011; Aggarwal and Harvey, 2013). Table 3-2 summarizes the 
grid coverage and serving area of each ISO or RTO in US.  
The regional collaborations in electricity wholesale market managed by ISOs/RTOs can 
reduce both technical and market barriers for renewable energy resources (MIT, 2011; Aggarwal 
and Harvey, 2013; Hitaj, 2013). On the one hand, the regional transmission network coordinated 
by ISOs/RTOs can increase flexibility and reliability of power system through more frequent 
electricity demand forecasting, close-to-real-time scheduling decision-making, and greater 
collaboration among all generators, transmission and distribution systems, and customers in the 
regions they serve. These features have great potential to better manage the fluctuation that 
intermittent wind power output poses to the grid at regional level and lower the operation cost of 
the transmission system for integrating wind. On the other hand, most wind farms are developed 
and operated by independent power producers. Compared with regions where the transmission 
grid is still managed and controlled by vertically-integrated utilities that owns generators as well, 
transmission grid coordinated by ISO/RTOs will be a favorable and open environment for wind 
power generators to enter the wholesale market (Hall et al., 2009).  
3.3 Theoretical Framework: The Learning Process in Wind Industry 
Based on technological learning, collaboration and network theories, I build my theoretical 
framework to explain how technological change has occurred as a result of learning among 
different actors in the US wind industry given the heterogeneous policy incentives and institutional 
arrangements across regions. Understanding this learning process can inform future policy design 
to facilitate different channels of learning. I identify the following channels of learning that could 
lead to productivity improvement of wind power. 
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3.3.1 Learning by doing (LBD) 
The traditional learning curve model explains increased productivity, typically measured 
through reduced production costs, as a function of learning from the accumulation of experience 
in production (Arrow, 1962; Grubler et al., 1999; Ibenholt, 2002; Junginger et al., 2005; Nemet, 
2012; Patridge, 2013; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Tang & Popp, 2016). In wind power, the 
productivity of a wind farm could be improved through the accumulation of experience in wind 
turbine manufacturing and installation, and/or through the accumulation of experience in wind 
project development and operation. As the wind turbine manufacturer’s experience in turbine 
production and installation increases over time, the efficiency of manufacturing a wind turbine and 
installing a wind turbine may increase. Similarly, experience of developing and operating wind 
projects helps project developers learn more about choosing a quality site, selecting a suitable wind 
turbine and operating the wind farm efficiently. Such experience will result in higher productivity 
for wind power generation.   
Thus, the first two hypotheses in this research are: 
H1: The more experience the wind project operator has developing and operating wind 
projects, the higher the productivity its wind farm will have.   
H2: The greater the production and installation experience of a project’s wind turbine 
manufacturer, the higher the productivity of the current project will be.  
3.3.2 Knowledge spillovers 
Not only do firms learn from their previous within-firm experience, but they may also learn 
from external experience from other firms, described as spillover effects by the existing literature 
on innovation and technology policy (Gruber, 1998; Thornton and Thompson, 2001). Once a new 
technology has been commercialized, its use is hard to hide from rival firms. As a result, firms can 
take advantage of the knowledge made available through the investment of other firms. This 
                  
63 
market failure provides justification for the government to subsidize emerging technologies so as 
to offset the private incentives to free-ride.   
In the wind industry, wind power companies can learn how to install and operate a wind 
farm from the experience of other wind projects (Nemet, 2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012). Using a 
panel data of wind projects in California, Nemet (2012) estimates the learning effects on wind 
farm installation and operation from statewide experience and wind projects in the global market. 
The results indicate that wind farm developers learn from external installation and operation 
experience. Such spillovers justify policies that subsidize the demand for wind technology. 
Similarly, Qiu and Anadon’s work (2012) on the Chinese wind industry also shows learning from 
industry-wide experience while Tang and Popp (2016) only find spillovers on wind farm 
installation rather than operation in China.  
This paper also tests the spillover effects at both state level and the industrial level: 
H3: Increased experience installing and operating wind projects by other firms in the 
industry is expected to lead to higher productivity for the current wind project.  
3.3.3 Learning by searching (LBS) 
In the wind industry, innovation often takes place in the manufacturing sector. The process 
that technology improvement through manufacturers’ research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) leads to cost reductions or improvement of productivity in wind power, is referred to as 
“learning-by-searching” (LBS) (Junginger et al, 2005; Kahouli-Brahmi, 2008). Examples of 
technological improvements through RD&D include larger turbines, lighter materials, more 
efficient turbine design and improved control systems, which could either reduce the cost of a wind 
turbine or increase the efficiency of converting wind energy to electricity.   
Extending traditional one-factor learning curve models to include R&D, several recent 
studies use two-factor learning models to disentangle the impacts of R&D and cumulative 
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experience on technological change in wind power. While the empirical studies on the European 
wind industry suggest that R&D is the dominant factor, research on the Chinese wind industry 
does not find the LBS effect (Soderholm & Klassen, 2007; Soderholm & Sundqvist, 2007; Qiu 
and Anadon, 2012; Tang & Popp, 2016). In this paper, I use a manufacturer-specific stock of 
knowledge to test the learning-by-searching effect in US wind industry:  
H4: The greater the knowledge stock that a wind turbine manufacturer has accumulated 
through its R&D, the higher the productivity of the project using its turbines will be.  
3.3.4 Learning by interacting (LBI)  
Existing literature on technological learning also discusses another channel of learning – 
learning by interacting (LBI). Improving network interactions between research institutes, 
manufacturers, and end-users allow for better diffusion of knowledge (Grubler, 1998; Junginger 
et al, 2005).  In collaboration and network theories, collaborative and long-term partnerships 
increase the likelihood of knowledge sharing by increasing trust and reducing information 
asymmetry between the two parties during the repeated cooperation (Inkpen & Currall 2004; 
Schneider, 2008). Firms can have some degree of access to the specialized knowledge of their 
partners while enhancing the existing knowledge and capacities within themselves (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990; Inkpen and Beamish 1997).  
In a wind project, the project operator works with its turbine supplier in many stages, such 
as turbine installation, operation and maintenance. Thus, another important channel of 
technological learning in wind projects could be the joint learning between project operator and 
wind turbine manufacturer on installation and operation through their collaboration in one or 
multiple wind projects. Frequent communication and training activities regarding operation and 
maintenance between turbine suppliers and project developers accelerate the absorption and 
dissemination of wind technologies. Previous work has found that the repeated collaboration 
                  
65 
between a Chinese wind project operator and its partner foreign turbine manufacturer on previous 
wind projects leads to reduction of wind power cost and the improvement of wind farm 
productivity in China (Tang and Popp, 2016).  
Apart from interacting with turbine manufacturer, a wind project operator also interacts 
with the transmission system owner in both installation and operational stage. Their repeated 
interactions facilitate joint learning on how to interconnect wind power—a variable energy 
resource that often imposes great uncertainty to the grid. This joint learning process and daily 
communication between wind farm operator and transmission distribution system will also help 
wind farm operator get familiar with connection codes required by the transmission system, and 
conduct dynamic reactive power control, so as to support the reliability of the network to which 
the wind farm is connected. For the grid operator, this joint learning also enables better system 
plan and operation so as to enhance grid reliability, which is one of the most important performance 
measurement of transmission grid. Consequently, all these activities may reduce curtailment34 and 
increase the capacity factor of a wind farm (Aho et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the two hypotheses about the learning-by-interacting effect are: 
 H5: The more collaboration that a wind project operator has with the same 
manufacturer, the higher productivity of their current project will be.  
H6: The more collaboration that a project operator has with the same transmission 
system owner on interconnecting wind generation, the higher productivity its current wind farm 
in that transmission system can be.  
As discussed in section 3.2, wind farms exist in a complex electric power system embedded 
in sophisticated institutions, and they are interconnected with other generators and consumers 
                                                 
34 Curtailment is a reduction in the electricity generation of a wind farm from what it could otherwise generate given 
available resources and its technical capacity that is not controlled by project developers but by grid operators. 
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through transmission/distribution system. The challenges of integrating wind power are often 
cross-boundary and cross-sector. The complexity of the transmission issue requires cross-region 
and cross-sector collaborative structure to deal with (McGuire, 2006; O’Toole, 1997). The regional 
collaborations in electricity wholesale market managed by ISO/RTOs can bring different 
participants in the regional market together, facilitate real-time information exchange in the 
regional transmission network. These ISO/RTOs work as a network system coordinator and 
controller, which may increase the effectiveness of the regional transmission system according to 
empirical evidence in emergency management network and mental health service network 
(Milward et al., 2009; McGuire, 2006; Provan & Milward 1995). If a wind farm is connected to a 
transmission system coordinated by an ISO/RTO, the daily scheduling and dispatching activities 
go beyond the bilateral interaction between the wind farm and the utility that owns the transmission 
system. Wind generators can interchange generation and information with other participants within 
the regional market through the coordination of the ISO/RTO. As a result, this regional 
collaboration in the transmission network allows a wind farm operator to access information and 
resources of other participants in the regional transmission network during the daily 
interconnecting activities, which may assist the wind farm to make better production decisions. 
Thus, I also test this interaction effect between bilateral collaboration and regionally coordinated 
transmission network: 
H7: The collaboration between a project operator and the same transmission system 
owner can lead to greater improvement of wind farm productivity if the transmission network is 
coordinated by an ISO/RTO. 
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3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Data  
To test the impacts of various learning channels on technological change, an unbalanced 
panel of 576 wind projects35 over the period 2001-2012 is constructed. Although the data from 
EIA 860 survey contains information on existing wind plants operating from 1975, electricity 
generation data before 2001 does not match well with plant information. In addition, the existing 
installed capacity after 2001 accounts for over 95% of the total installed wind capacity in the US 
so that the sample has a high level of representativeness.  
These sample wind projects are operated by 82 project operators, and use wind turbines 
from 23 turbine manufacturers. They are interconnected to the transmission or distribution systems 
owned by 167 transmission distribution system owners. Therefore, many project operators and 
turbine manufactures participated in more than one wind project. Similarly, a project operator may 
have cooperated with the same transmission system owners in multiple projects.   
Several datasets are combined for this study. I collect project level data, such as the project 
owner/operators, installed capacity, project timeline, number of wind turbines, transmission 
distribution system owner, and project location from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
survey 860.  Project monthly generation data is collected from EIA survey 923, survey 920, and 
survey 906. The information on wind turbines for each project is collected from American Wind 
Energy Association (AWEA) database and EIA 860 survey. State level renewable energy policy 
data is collected from the Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) and the 
patent data for knowledge stock calculation is obtained from the Thomson Innovation Patent 
Database. The hourly wind speed data at each wind farm site is collected from 3TIER database. 36 
                                                 
35 This sample only includes wind projects that have a nameplate capacity of 1MW or greater and are connected to 
the local or regional electric power grid because only these power plants report to EIA. 
36 https://www.3tier.com/.  
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3.4.2 Key Variables 
3.4.2.1 Dependent variable  
In this study, technological change in wind power is measured as the average capacity factor 
of a particular wind farm i in year t. Capacity factor is a widely-used measurement for wind farm 
technical performance in wind industry reports (Wiser et al., 2011 & 2012). As shown in equation 
(1), it is the ratio of the actual electricity produced by a wind farm in a given period, to its potential 
output if it was operated at its full nameplate capacity for the entire period, which captures the 







  (1) 
3.4.2.2 Manufacturer’s knowledge stock (Learning-by-searching) 
Learning by searching depicts the process through which R&D activities lead to cost 
reduction/productivity improvement. Previous studies testing LBS in the wind manufacturing 
sector model wind farm costs or wind power prices as a function of the knowledge stock, which is 
either derived from country level R&D expenditure or technologies adopted by turbine 
manufacturers (Klaassen et al., 2005; Kobos et al., 2006; Soderholm and Sundqvist, 2007; Qiu and 
Anadon, 2012). Since firm level R&D data are not available, I apply the same method using the 
outcome of R&D – a manufacturer’s global patent applications on wind turbines – to create each 
firm’s knowledge stock. The knowledge stock variable is calculated as follow:  
LBSit =LBSt-1*(1-ρ) + NPt                (2) 
where LBSt-1 represents the existing knowledge stock from year t-1,  ρ is the depreciation rate, and 
NPt-1 represents the number of new patents that the manufacturer applied for in year t. I lag the 
manufacturer’s knowledge stock to account for the time needed to convert an innovation to mass 
manufacturing. Since knowledge related to wind power may depreciate over time, I use a 15% 
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depreciation rate to calculate the knowledge stock in our empirical model, which is a typical 
knowledge decay rate used in the R&D literature (Griliches, 1995; Popp, 2004).37 
Each turbine manufacturer’s patent applications relevant to wind energy is identified by 
the patent family ID38, which include innovations pertaining to wind turbine manufacturing, 
installation, testing and monitoring, and maintenance. 39  These applications are dated by the 
priority date, as this corresponds most closely to when the innovative activity actually took place.40 
If a project uses wind turbines from two manufacturers, I calculate the weighted average 
knowledge stock using the shares of their installed capacity in this project as weights.  
3.4.2.3 Experience at different levels (Learning-by-doing & spillovers) 
To test learning-by-doing effect, existing experience curve literature estimates wind farm 
capital cost or wind power production cost as a function of the cumulative installation of wind 
farms or cumulative electricity generation (Grubler et al., 1999; Ibenholt, 2002; Junginger et al., 
2005; Nemet, 2006 & 2012; Qiu and Anadon, 2012; Patridge, 2013). We follow this approach to 
construct the project developer’s experience (LBDdev) and the turbine manufacturer’s experience 
(LBDmft). These experience variables are measured by the cumulative installed capacities through 
year t for a project developer and a manufacturer respectively.  
If wind project installation and operation cannot be hidden from other competitors, a wind 
project can also benefit from the installation and operation experience from other projects in the 
industry. I use cumulative installed capacity at state level and industry level to measure the total 
                                                 
37 I also test the effects of knowledge stock calculated with a 10% depreciation rate. The results are not sensitive to 
the choice of discount rates. 
38 Manufacturers file patent applications globally. If some patent applications belong to the same patent family, I 
record as one patent application for the knowledge stock variable construction to avoid double counting. 
39 I identify the relevant patents by using the International Patent Classification (IPC), which is a classification 
system developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization and used by patent offices around the world to 
identify the technology represented in each patent.  IPC classification F03D represents wind energy patents. 
40 For a patent application, priority date is the earliest application date anywhere in the world. 
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wind project experience at these two aggregate levels respectively. To test the spillover effects, 
the experience of project i’s operator and manufacturer is subtracted from the aggregate level 
experience, as in Nemet (2012) and Qiu and Anadon (2012).  
3.4.2.4 Collaboration experience (Learning-by-interacting) 
Since empirical test for learning-by-interacting effects has been rare so far, I follow the 
collaboration and network literature to measure the interactions among wind project participants. 
These empirical studies use frequency of collaborative activities or interactions among actors 
within a network or a partnership to measure the level of interaction and collaboration among 
partners (O’Toole and Meier, 2004; Lundin, 2007). Given the project level data in my sample, I 
measure collaboration between a project operator and manufacturer (LBI_mftit) by calculating the 
cumulative capacity of previous projects using both the same project operator and manufacturer. I 
construct the collaboration between a project operator and the TDS owner (LBI_tdsit) in a similar 
way. These variables can also be thought of as the shared wind farm operating or interconnecting 
experience between these project participants. If a wind project use wind turbines from two 
manufacturers, I calculate the weighted average cooperating experience using the shares of their 
installed capacity in this project as weights.  
3.4.2.5 Policy variables  
I include state level renewable energy policies and transmission regulation as control 
variables while using year-fixed effects to control for other federal level policies and items such 
as changing input prices, industry-wide and global technological change. 
I construct a dummy variable indicating whether a wind project is interconnected to a 
transmission system coordinated by an ISO/RTO. If not, the transmission system is still operated 
under vertically-integrated utility regulation.  
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According to the different incentives that state energy renewable polices give to wind farm 
operators and turbine manufacturers as discussed in section 3.2.2, I include five state energy policy 
variables in the model. I construct three binary variables for public benefits funds, mandatory green 
power option and the RPS.  
For the financial incentives, I create two dummy variables for the production-based 
financial incentives and capital cost reduction incentives. If state i in year t has any kind of 
production based taxes or subsidies, I code the production-based incentive variable as 1. Similarly, 
if state i in year t has any capital cost reduction incentives, the cost incentive variable is recorded 
as 1.  
3.4.2.6 Other Control variables  
 To accurately assess the impact of learning on the dependent variables, I also control for 
other project features and time-varying state characteristics that may affect wind farm installation 
and productivity.  
 Wind turbine size (Turbine_sizei). Larger wind turbines access greater wind resources 
available at greater heights, allowing them to capture more energy so as to produce more power. 
If a wind project has more than one type of wind turbine, I use average wind turbine size.  
 Wind project scale (Project_sizei).  Wind projects with larger installed capacity will have 
economies of scale. As a result, it reduce wind power production costs (Berry 2009, Qiu and 
Anadon, 2012; Partridge, 2013).  
 Wind resource available. If the project site has better wind resources, it should have 
higher productivity. Thus, I control for the wind resource available for project i in year t by using 
hourly wind speed at 80 meters above sea level at its site. To be more specific, the windiness of a 
location is measured by the potential maximum capacity factor that a state-of-the-art wind turbine 
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can achieve given the available wind energy at site i in year t.41 In this way, this control variable 
is exogenous to the actual turbine selection and operation for each project i.  
 State electricity consumption and price.  I control the demand for electricity and 
electricity price of state i in year t because these two variables have direct influences on utilities’ 
investment decisions in renewable energy and generation from renewables.  
 State socioeconomics and political environment. A state’s status of socioeconomics 
affects the investment level in renewable energy. The socioeconomic state is measured by the 
Gross State Product per capita. A state’s political institutions can also affect the deployment of 
renewable energy. A state with governing bodies that favor environmental legislations is expected 
to demonstrate a higher political commitment to clean energy development. I control for the 
political environment by using the League of Conservation Voters Scores (LCV) that has been 
used in previous studies (Carley, 2009; Yin and Power, 2010), which is an index ranging from 0 
to 100 representing the levels of support on environmental policy agenda from the Senate and the 
House of Representative.  
Table 3-3 summarizes the description of explanatory variables for different channels of 
learning, energy policies, and other control variables. The summary statistics for the major 
variables used in the empirical models are reported in Table 3-4.  
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3-2 shows the trend of the average capacity factor and the annual total electricity 
generation of the sample wind projects from 2001 to 2012. The total wind power generation has 
increased sharply from 2001 to 2012. The annual total electricity generation from wind power in 
2012 is nearly 22 times larger than the total wind generation in 2001. Similarly, the average 
                                                 
41 Calculation of the potential maximum capacity factor is introduced in details in Appendix 1.  
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capacity factor of wind farms in the United States has also increased from 0.24 in 2001 to 0.34 in 
2012.  
3.5 Empirical Model and Results 
To explain what has led to the improvement of wind farm productivity over time, I test the 
impacts of different learning channels on two subsystem of wind power production—wind farm 
installation, and wind farm operation. First, I analyze drivers that improve the first year wind farm 
performance. This improvement in immediate performance after wind farm installation can reflect 
project participants’ learning on wind farm siting, project design, and wind turbine technology 
selection in the stage of wind farm development and installation.  Second, I estimate the learning 
effects on wind farm operation by examining whether a given wind farm’s performance improves 
over time, and what leads to that improvement. The performance improvement over time reflects 
learning on wind farm operation and maintenance, and grid interconnection in the stage of wind 
farm operation. 
3.5.1 Learning Effects on Wind Farm Installation 
As the first step, I estimate the improvement of capacity factor in the first year operation 
across wind projects and test the learning effects on wind farm installation. Although the projects 
in my sample are observed at multiple years throughout their operating periods, I only use the first 
full-year operating data of each project for this stage of analysis. However, the capacity factor of 
a wind project may also react to unobserved features of its neighboring projects or states, such as 
any form of unobserved learning among projects in close geographic proximity, or spillovers of 
omitted policies, economic and political features from neighboring states. Therefore, we use a 
spatial error model to capture this potential spatial dependency in the omitted variables across 
observations (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Ward and Gleditsch, 2007). I estimate the 
learning effects across projects at the time each project is installed using equation (3).  
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𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖+𝛽3𝑍1𝑖 + +𝛽4𝑍2𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 
                                     +𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑢𝑖 +
𝜆 ∑ 𝒘𝒊 ɛ𝑖                                                                         (3) 
 
where for project i installed in year t=0, 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡=1 is the capacity factor of that project in its first fully-
year operation, 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡=0  represents various learning variables at the year of installation 
which capture the knowledge stock and cumulative experience that wind project participants have 
at the time of installation, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖 represents different existing policies in the state where project 
i is located at and the governance structure of the transmission network that project i is connected 
to in year t=1,  𝑍1𝑖 represents other time-variant control variables in Table 3 at year t=1, and 𝑍2𝑖 
is the vector of project characteristics such as project size and average turbine size. Because the 
first year operation of these wind farms are observed at different years, year dummies are added 
to control for the time varying unobservables for all the projects, such as technological change, 
federal renewable energy policies, and economic shocks. State dummies are also included to 
control for state heterogeneities that do not change much over time, such as natural resource 
endowment, topographical and meteorological features.  
I decompose the overall error into two components: 1) a spatially uncorrelated error term 
ui, that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed; and 2) the spatial component of 
the error term ɛ𝑖 . The spatial weight vector 𝒘𝒊 reflects the distance between project i and any other 
projects in our sample. More weight is placed on a nearby project than a distant project. 42 We use 
project coordinates to compute the distance between each of the two projects in our sample. The 
                                                 
42 I construct an inverse-distance spatial weight matrix to capture the proximity among all the observations (i.e. wi is 
row i from the matrix), in which weights are inversely related to the distances between projects. By convention, the 
diagonal elements of the matrix are set to zero and the row elements are normalized so that they sum to 1 (Anselin 
and Bera, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Fischer and Varga, 2003; Drukker et al., 2013). For technical details on the 
construction of the inverse-distance spatial weight matrix, see Drukker et al., 2013. 
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spatial autoregressive coefficient λ indicates the extent to which the spatial component of error 
terms ɛ are correlated with each other among observations. If λ is significantly different from zero, 
it suggests that the spatial component of the errors are correlated with other nearby projects. 
Otherwise, the model reduces to a standard linear regression model where projects are independent 
of one another. Due to the potential correlation among error terms, maximum likelihood method 
is used to estimate the spatial error models.43 
Table 3-5 reports the regression results of equation (3). Among the three models, model (1) 
only includes learning effects of different actors while model (2) adds policy variables. Model (3) 
further includes an interaction term between bilateral interconnection collaboration that a wind 
farm operator has with its transmission/distribution system owner and the regional transmission 
network coordination through ISO/RTO. The learning-by-searching effect on wind farm 
installation, captured by manufacturer’s knowledge stock, is significant across all three models. 
However, the magnitude of the LBS effect is very small. In the short run, one more patent from 
the manufacturer increases the first-year capacity factor by approximately 0.4 percentage point. 
As for the learning-by-doing effect, we can see that the project operator’s experience alone also 
has significant impacts on the improvement of the first-year performance.  
Larger impacts on performance improvement come from collaboration experience between 
manufacturer and project operator, and the collaboration experience between project operator and 
the transmission distribution owner have significantly improved the first-year performance of a 
wind farm. An additional 1 GW installed capacity by a project owner with the same manufacturer 
will increase the first-year capacity factor by 6.0 to 6.4 percentage points. For the collaboration 
between project operator and TDS owners, an additional 1 GW capacity interconnected to the same 
                                                 
43 I also estimate the linear models without spatial error terms by ordinary least squares. The results are very consistent 
with the results from spatial error models presented in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6.  
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TDS is expected to increase the first-year capacity factor by around 4 percent points. An average 
wind project size is approximately 60 MW in the sample. Therefore, the coefficient indicates that 
one more project that the project operator collaborate with the same manufacturer will lead to 
approximately 0.36-0.39 percentage point increase in capacity factor while one more project that 
the project operator interconnect to the same TDS is expected to increase the first-year capacity 
factor by 0.24 percentage point.  
From model (1) to (3), we cannot observe significant knowledge spillover on the siting and 
technology selection. Similarly, the impacts of state renewable energy policies and ISO/RTO-
coordinated transmission network on the technical improvement of wind farm installation are not 
clear. However, wind farm initial performance after installation reacts to unobservables in 
neighbouring projects as indicated by the significant spatial autocorrelation coefficient across all 
models. This spatial dependence among error terms could be unobserved learning from other wind 
projects in close proximity, or spillovers from omitted economic or political status in neighbouring 
states.  
3.5.2 Learning Effects on Wind Farm Operation 
In the second step, I test the learning effects on wind farm operation by estimating the 
improvement of capacity factor within wind project over time. In this stage of estimation, each 
project is observed multiple times throughout their operation periods. The empirical model is 
shown as equation (4):  
𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑍1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆 ∑ 𝒘𝒊ɛ𝑖𝑡       (4) 
Compared to equation (3), I add project fixed effects (ai) into the model and exclude 
those time-invariant control variables and state dummies because they are captured by the project 
fixed effects. With a panel data of wind projects, I estimate both project fixed effects model and 
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random effects model. Again, the error term is decomposed into two components to capture the 
unobserved spatial correlations among neighboring wind projects.  
Table 3-6 shows the results for both project fixed effects model and random effect model. 
In terms of learning effects on wind farm operation, the learning channels are similar to the 
learning channels that wind project participants acquire knowledge to improve the wind farm 
installation productivity, which are the learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting. Wind 
project operators benefit from their own operating experience and their interaction with their 
turbine manufacturer partners and transmission distribution owners. Particularly, the collaborating 
experience has the largest impact on improving the operational performance in terms of capacity 
factor. While the manufacturer’s knowledge stock embedded in the wind turbines affect the first-
year performance across projects in my first stage of analysis, the knowledge stock of a 
manufacturer becomes insignificant in improving the operational performance of a wind farm over 
time. Therefore, the results for different learning channels indicate that wind farm operational 
performance is mainly improved through the learning-by-doing process, especially the interactions 
among different participants along the wind power production chain during their learning-by-doing. 
Another interesting observation from Table 3-6 is the knowledge spillovers at the state 
level. Although it has smaller impacts than the knowledge flows through collaborative partnerships, 
the external-firm experience also improves the wind farm operational performance. Compared 
with the results for learning on wind farm installation, this result suggests that operational 
experience is easier to be learnt across firms than the siting and technology selection skills, which 
provides justification to the subsidies for wind farm operators (Jaffe, 2005; Nemet, 2012).  
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The impacts of policy variables become significant during the operational stage. The 
ISO/RTO’s coordination in transmission system has strong influence on wind farm capacity factor 
both within a wind farm over time and across different wind farms. On average, the existence of 
ISO/RTO in the regional power system can improve a wind farm’s capacity factor by 1 to 1.3 
percentage points. The interaction term between bilateral collaboration experience and ISO/RTO 
is also significant in both fixed effects model and random effects model. This indicates that the 
improvement of capacity factor coming from daily interconnecting activities is even larger when 
a wind farm operator can reach beyond its bilateral interaction with the transmission system owner 
and interchange resources with other participants in the regional transmission network governed 
by an ISO/RTO. 
The production-based financial incentives and RPS have positive effects on capacity factor 
in both fixed effects model and random effects model while other types of polices still do not have 
significant impacts on operational performance. Both production-based financial incentives and 
RPS are designed to promote more electricity generation from renewable. The empirical evidence 
from Table 6 provides support for these production-based policy instruments.  
3.6 Conclusions  
Using a panel of US wind projects between 2001 and 2012, this paper examines the effects 
of different channels of learning – learning through R&D in wind turbine manufacturing, learning 
from wind farm operator’s previous project experience of installation, learning from the experience 
of other firms, and learning through collaboration among wind project participants—on 
technological change of wind power in US. I consider the learning impacts on wind farm 
installation and wind farm operation in the institutional context of renewable energy policies and 
electric power system. 
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3.6.1 Learning-by-interacting and regional collaboration in electric power system 
This paper provides the first empirical evidence of learning-by-interacting effect in the US 
wind industry. It is the collaborative experience that the project operator has with a particular 
turbine manufacturer, and with the transmission system that the wind farm is connected to, that 
greatly improves wind farm performance right after installation and throughout the operational 
stage, which suggests the learning-by-interacting effect in both wind farm installation and 
operation. On top of that, if the transmission system is coordinated by an ISO/RTO, the repeated 
interconnecting activities will result in even higher capacity factor than merely the bilateral 
collaboration between the wind farm operator and the transmission system operator.  
According to the FERC orders, the purpose of creating these independent and interest-
neutral ISO/RTOs to coordinate the transmission network and organize the electricity wholesale 
market is to increase the grid efficiency, flexibility and reliability. Compared with electricity 
market and transmission system controlled by traditional vertically-integrated utilities, the 
empirical evidence suggests that an ISO/RTO fulfills its goals by coordinating all generators, 
transmission/distribution system owners, and retailers within its network (in a state or across 
multiple states). This regional collaboration can improve the capacity to integrate an intermittent 
renewable resources like wind energy into the grid through better forecasting of wind generation 
and demand, pooling reserves, increased market liquidity, and coordinated planning for new 
generation and transmission infrastructure (Hitaj, 2013; MIT, 2011). Thus, it would be desirable 
to bring more transmission networks under the coordination of an ISO/RTO or other similar 
regional collaboration regime to handle higher penetration of wind energy in the US power system.  
3.6.2 Learning-by-doing, spillovers and demand-pull policy design 
Consistent with previous research on learning curve in wind power (Qiu and Anadon, 2012; 
Nemet, 2012; Patridge, 2013; Tang and Popp, 2016 ), I also find learning-by-doing effects for 
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wind project operators, as well as spillovers from statewide wind farm operating experience. While 
wind project operators benefit from their past internal experience on both wind farm installation 
and wind power generation, inter-firm spillovers only appear for wind farm operation rather than 
installation. For installation, there may be spillovers among projects in close geographic proximity 
rather than spillovers from statewide or industrywide experience, which needs further examination 
through qualitative research. Still, the evidence of inter-firm spillovers on wind farm operation 
justifies the need for subsidies, in the form of tax credits or feed-in tariffs, to users of wind 
technologies – wind power generators. These demand-pull subsidies can offset private incentives 
to wait and free-ride on the learning benefits from wind project investments by other developers 
and turbine manufacturers.  
It is also worth noting that characteristics of these demand-pull policies would provide 
different incentives to wind farm operators. While production-driven policies like RPS and 
production tax credits can promote electricity generation of a wind farm over time, policy tools 
that encourage wind capital investment do not seem to improve wind farm performance.  
3.6.3 Learning-by-searching effect in the US wind industry 
Going further from previous empirical research on technological learning in the US wind 
industry (Nemet, 2012), this paper successfully separates learning-by-searching effects from 
learning-by-doing in at wind farm level. However, learning-by-searching effects only appear in 
wind farm installation stage. With advancement of wind turbine technologies, the projects 
developed later are able to select and adopt better wind technologies than wind projects installed 
previously, which improve wind farm productivity across projects over time. When a wind project 
comes to its operational stage, however, its performance is improved through gaining more 
operational experience or know-how rather than manufacturer’s technology advancement.   
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Policy Type (Incentives) Policy Tools 




1) Quantity-based tools: renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) 
2) Price-based tools: production tax credits 
Renewable investment 
incentives 
Price-based tools: wind equipment sales tax exemption, 
property tax exemption 
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Table 3-2  Serving Area of ISO/RTOs in US 
 
  
ISO/RTO  Serving Area 
California ISO (CAISO) California and Nevada 
Midcontinent ISO (MISO) Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin 
South Power Pool (SPP) Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and 
Texas 
Electric Reliability Council of Taxes 
(ERCOT) 
Taxes 
ISO New England (ISONE) Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
New York ISO (NYISO) New York 
PJM Interconnection (PJM) Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of 
Columbia 
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Learning variables (𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕) 
𝑳𝑩𝑺𝒊𝒕  Manufacturer’s knowledge stock: cumulative patents related to wind power 
that the manufacturer has in year t. 
𝑳𝑩𝑫_𝒎𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒕 Manufacturer’s experience: manufacturer’s cumulative installed capacity in 
year t. 
𝑳𝑩𝑫_𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒕 
Project owner’s experience: project owner’s cumulative installed capacity in 
year t. 
Spillover_state it Experience of wind projects in the industry: cumulative installed capacity  
 at state level in year t. 
𝑺𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓_𝒊𝒅𝒔𝒊𝒕 
Experience of wind projects in the industry: cumulative installed capacity 
nationwide in year t.  
𝑳𝑩𝑰_𝒎𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒕 
Collaborative experience between project owner and manufacturer: 
cumulative capacities installed by the project owner and the same manufacturer in 
year t. 
𝑳𝑩𝑰_𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒊𝒕 
Collaborative experience between project owner and transmission 
distribution system owner: cumulative electricity that the project owner has 
interconnected to the same transmission distribution system in year t. 
 
Policy variables (Policyit) 
ISO/RTOit Binary variable, whether project i is connected to a transmission system 
coordinated by an ISO or RTO in year t. 
𝑷𝑩𝑭𝒊𝒕 Binary variable, whether the state where project i is located in has public benefit 
funds to support renewable energy projects in year t. 
𝑮𝑷𝒊𝒕 Binary variable, whether the state has mandatory green power purchase in year t. 
𝑹𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 Binary variable, whether the state has Renewable Portfolio Standards in year t. 
Production_incentivesit  Binary variable, whether the state has any incentives paid based on electricity 
production from a wind plant in year t.  
Cost _incentivesit Binary variable, whether the state has any tax credits or exemption for wind 
equipment or installation costs.  
Time-varying 𝒁𝟏𝒊𝒕 
Wind_resouceit Wind energy (potential maximum capacity factor) available at project i in year t. 
𝑮𝑺𝑷𝒊𝒕    Gross state product per capita in year t.  
𝑮𝑺𝑷_𝒇𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕   Percent of total GSP in the from petroleum and coal manufacturing in year t. 
𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚_𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕  Electricity price in the state where project i is located in. 
𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆_𝒆𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕    
 
Time-invariant Z2i 
LCV House of Representative pro-environment score for the state in year t.  
Project_sizei The total installed capacity of project i 
Turbine sizei The average size of wind turbines installed in project i 
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Table 3-4  Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
N= 4040 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Max Min 
     
Capacity factor 0.284 0.028 0.682 0.103 
Manufacturer's knowledge stock 
(Decay rate = 0.15)  
56.3 37.30 343.75 0 
Manufacturer's cumulative 
installed capacity (GW) 
3.703 2.779 24.085 0 
Project operator's cumulative 
installed capacity (GW) 
1.747 0.970 9.814 0 
Cooperating installed capacity 
between turbine manufacturer 
and project operator(GW) 
0.789 0.218 4.938 0 
Cooperating interconnected 
capacity between project 
operator and TDS (GW) 
0.243 0.094 2.938 0 
State level cumulative installed 
capacity (GW) 
0.806 1.028 12.214 0 
Industrial level cumulative 
installed capacity (GW) 
23.652 8.391 60.007 4.147 
ISO/RTO  0.762 0.015 1 0 
Public benefits funds 0.423 0.367 1 0 
RPS 0.704 0.457 1 0 
Green power purchase option 0.113 0.317 1 0 
Production incentives 0.353 0.387 1 0 
Cost incentives 0.198 0.399 1 0 
  
                  
89 
Table 3-5  Effects of Learning and State Policies on Wind Farm Installation 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
cfit    
Learning Variables    
Knowledge stock of  0.0040** 0.0037* 0.0042** 
manufacturer (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Turbine manufacturer’s  0.0259 0.0305 0.0349 
experience (GW) (0.0157) (0.1932) (0.2042) 
Project operator’s  0.0213** 0.0224* 0.0225* 
experience(GW) (0.0094) (0.0131) (0.0138) 
Collaboration between manufacturer 0.0584*** 0.0626*** 0.0645*** 
and project operator (GW) (0.0183) (0.0227) (0.0243) 
Collaboration between project 0.0332** 0.0416** 0.0401** 
operator and TDS (GW) (0.0159) (0.0192) (0.0181) 
Collaboration between project    0.0019 
operator and TDS * ISO/RTO   (0.0082) 
Spillover from the state (GW) 0.0023 0.0029 0.0033 
 (0.0152) (0.0168) (0.0274) 
Spillover from the industry(GW)  0.0015 0.0020 0.0023 
 (0.0119) (0.0204) (0.0049) 
Policy Variables    
ISO/RTO  0.0542 0.0503 
  (0.2049) (0.3042) 
Public Benefit Funds  -0.1202 -0.1401 
  (-0.2453) (-0.2049) 
RPS  0.0029 0.0032 
  (0.0045) (0.0052) 
Production Incentives   0.0237 0.0235 
  (0.0592) (0.0503) 
Cost Incentives  -0.1295 -0.1402 
  (-0.2390) (-0.2105) 
Mandatory Green Power  -0.2439 -0.2195 
Purchase  (-0.1921) (-0.2039) 
    
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial autocorrelation coefficient λ:  0.345*** 0.284*** 0.279*** 
Observations 576 576 576 
R-squared 0.713 0.720 0.748 
Note:     1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
3) Spatial error model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
4) Other control variables are not shown in the table, including project size, average turbine size, wind 
resource, state electricity price, electricity consumption, and LCV pro-environment score.  
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Table 3-6  Effects of Learning and State Policies on Wind Farm Operation 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
cfit Fixed effects  Fixed effects Random effects Random effects  
Learning Variables     
Knowledge stock of  0.0104 0.0120 -0.0239 -0.0242 
manufacturer (0.0420) (0.0201) (-0.0190) (-0.0197) 
Turbine manufacturer’s  0.0042 0.0046 0.0069 0.0070 
experience alone (GW) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0204) (0.0201) 
Project operator’s  0.0309** 0.0303** 0.0245** 0.0242* 
experience  (GW) (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0119) (0.0128) 
Collaboration between manufacturer 0.0312* 0.0315* 0.0428** 0.0432** 
and project operator (GW) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0205) (0.0210) 
Collaboration between 0.0423*** 0.0329** 0.0324* 0.0228** 
operator and TDS (GW) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0093) 
Collaboration between project   0.0213**  0.0219*** 
operator and TDS * ISO/RTO  (0.0080)  (0.0082) 
Spillover from the state (GW) 0.0078** 0.0079* 0.0028 0.0024 
 (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Spillover from the industry (GW) 0.0029 0.0027 0.0038 0.0033 
 (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0154) 
Policy Variables     
ISO/RTO 0.0129*** 0.0122*** 0.0103** 0.0098** 
 (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Public Benefit Funds -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0042 -0.0045 
 (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0143) (0.0129) 
RPS 0.0039** 0.0042** 0.0032** 0.00032** 
 (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.0015) (0.00015) 
Production Incentives  0.0024** 0.0028** 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Cost Incentives -0.0282 -0.0276 -0.0819 -0.0813 
 (0.1300) (0.1348) (0.2442) (0.2427) 
Mandatory Green Power -0.1924 -0.1892 0. 2621 0. 2642 
Purchase (0.1495) (0.1697) (0.2019) (0.1985) 
     
Project fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial autocorrelation coefficient λ: 0.467 0.474 0.186*** 0.198*** 
R-squared 0.640 0.649 0.602 0.609 
Observations 4040 4040 4040 4040 
Projects 576 576 576 576 
 
 Notes:   1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
3) Spatial error model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
4) Except for policy variables, other control variables are not shown in the table.  Control variables for 
models with random effects include wind resource, project size, average turbine size, wind power class, 
state electricity price, electricity consumption, and LCV pro-environment score. In models with project 
fixed effects, I exclude project size, and average turbine size.  
                  
91 












(Public and private utilities 








Electric Power System  
 
ISO/RTOs 
(Non-profit transmission system operator 
that coordinates generators, transmission 
system owned by utilities, and retailers at 
regional level) 
                  
92 











































Annual Electricity Generation and Capacity Factor
Annual Electricity Generation (GWh) Average Capacity Factor
                  
93 
Appendix 
Calculation of Wind Resource Available 
To control for wind resource available for each wind project in a given year, I construct 
the potential maximum capacity factor, 𝐶𝐹_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡,  which is an estimate of electricity that could 
be generated from wind energy available at site i in year t if using wind turbines at the technology 
frontier. In this paper, I use General Electric 2.5 MW (GE 2.5) wind turbine as the state-of-the-art 
turbine model as used in previous work from Lu et al. (2009) and Nemet (2012). In addition, I also 
assume there is no curtailment so that this potential maximum capacity factor is exogenous to the 
actual wind power system. To calculate 𝐶𝐹_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡,  I collect hourly wind speed data at 80 meters 
above sea level for each site from 2001 to 2013 from 3Tier time wind time series data.44 With this 
hourly wind speed data, the maximum capacity factor available at site i in year t is estimated as 
follows:  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖ℎ = 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑉𝑖ℎ) (1) 
𝐶𝐹_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  
1
24×365
∫ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖(ℎ) 𝑑ℎ (2) 
where 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖ℎ is the hourly technical potential for wind power generation at site i, 
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the power curve45 for GE 2.5, and 𝑉𝑖ℎ is the hourly wind speed at site i at time h. I calculate 
the integral of the hourly maximum generation at site i over the year and get the maximum potential 
capacity factor of site i in year t (𝐶𝐹_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡). 
 
  
                                                 
44 Utility scale wind turbines (greater than 1MW) are typically installed at 80 meters (262 feets) or higher.  
45 The power curve functions used in this paper are collected from turbine manufacturers.  
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Chapter 4:  Network Governance and Effectiveness on Renewable Energy 
Integration: A Comparative Case Study on Power Transmission Networks 
in the United States 
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4.1 Introduction 
To achieve carbon emission reductions and energy security, state governments in the 
United States are promoting renewable energy in the power sector through a variety of policy tools. 
Among all renewable energy, wind power, because of its unpredictable intermittent production 
features, imposes high level of variability and uncertainty to the power system. Massive integration 
of this variable energy resource (VER) 46  in the current power system requires regional 
collaboration among power producers, transmission system operators, load-serving entities, and 
different levels of regulatory agencies to maintain system resilience and ensure reliability (Koch, 
2009; Hall et al., 2009; Klass and Wilson, 2012). These organizations from different sectors 
interact in the regional transmission service networks.  
Following the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)’s orders to develop a 
competitive and transparent electricity market,47 the restructuring of the US electricity wholesale 
market resulted in two different models of regional transmission network governance since early 
2000s. In most regions, as shown in Figure 4-1, transmission networks are coordinated by seven 
Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission Organizations (ISO/RTOs). Created by 
partnered power producers, utilities that own transmission assets, and load serving entities, these 
ISO/RTOs are nonprofit and interest-neutral network administrative organizations (NAOs). While 
they do not own any transmission or generation assets, they serve as regional transmission system 
controllers, coordinate transmission services, and organize the electricity wholesale market. In 
other regions (i.e. Non-RTO West and Non-RTO Southeast in Figure 1), the transmission system 
                                                 
46 Wind energy is often referred to “variable energy resource” (VER) because it is intermittent and the variability of 
generation is subjected to limited control of wind power plant operators. 
47 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is an independent agency that regulates the interstate 
transmission and wholesale sales of electricity, natural gas, and oil. For details about FERC’s deregulation orders, 
see FERC Order 888 and 889.  
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is controlled and managed by one or multiple integrated utilities that owns both generation and 
transmission assets. Without a centralized independent transmission operator, these large utilities 
coordinate with each other to ensure region-wide reliability of the power system. In these shared-
governance networks (Provan & Kenis, 2008), external regional coordinating agencies also exist, 
which only take on some governance activities while leaving transmission system operation and 
market coordination to those integrated utilities (Hall et al., 2009).  
A few empirical studies have shown that growth of wind generation capacities and wind 
farm performance in RTO-governed transmission networks are significant higher than non-RTO 
regions (Hitaj, 2011; Tang, 2016). However, the underlying mechanisms through which a 
particular transmission governance model facilitates or impedes wind power deployment are not 
fully revealed, particularly from the perspective of network governance. In this paper, I am filling 
this intellectual gap and examining how transmission network governance affects wind power 
integration. Based on network governance theoretical framework, this paper addresses two 
research questions: 1) how structural properties of a transmission network affect its effectiveness 
in integrating wind power; and 2) how coordinating mechanisms in a transmission network affect 
its effectiveness in integrating wind power. Using archival data and interviews with key network 
participants, a comparative case study is conducted between an ISO/RTO-governed transmission 
network and a transmission network in non-RTO region.  
This paper contributes to both literature on network governance, and studies on renewable 
energy deployment in the power sector. Previous literature on network governance has proposed 
a theoretical framework to evaluate network effectiveness, and identified contingencies that 
explain why a certain governance mode is likely to be effective or not (Provan & Milward 1995; 
Provan and Kenis, 2008). Most empirical studies testing these hypotheses concentrate in the fields 
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of public health (Provan and Milward, 1995; Milward et al., 2009), education (O’Toole and Meier, 
2004), economic development (Savas and Savas, 2000; Feiock et al., 2010), and emergency 
management (Kapucu, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Kapucu et al., 2010; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012). 
This paper will be the first to examine the relationship between network governance and network 
effectiveness in the power sector. On top of that, the transmission network cases extend existing 
theories by highlighting the underlying mechanisms through which particular network structural 
properties or coordinating processes can achieve both system stability and flexibility, particularly 
when the network is embedded in a turbulent environment with uncertainties and disruptions. 
These new findings can be applied to studies on resilience of other complex resource management 
and delivery networks that operate over large spatial scales.  
While most literature on renewable energy diffusion in US is at state level and focuses on 
renewable generation (Carley, 2009; Yin and Powers, 2010; Buckman, 2011; Gaul and Carley, 
2012; Shrimali, et al., 2013; Kim and Tang, 2014), this paper adds to existing studies a regional 
perspective and makes substantial contribution to understanding the links between regional 
transmission network governance and their outcome in terms of renewable energy integration. It 
also informs electricity market design for high renewable energy penetration, and sheds light on 
how to forge effective collaboration among power producers and transmission system operators to 
manage variable energy resources in different types of electricity market.  
4.2 The Context: Power System Operation and Renewable Energy Development in US 
4.2.1 Multiple Public Interests in Transmission Network Operation 
The US power system is a vast network that consists of two layers. Physically, the power 
system is a network of electric generating units, loads, and transmission and distribution systems 
that move electric energy from generators to ultimate loads. From an organizational perspective, 
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it is a cross-sectoral network of power generators, transmission system operators, load serving 
entities, end consumers, and other entities involved in the electricity market (MIT, 2011).48 These 
two layers of network are interdependent of each other. This paper examines both layers of the 
power network with a focus on the electricity wholesale market operated within the transmission 
network, since the wholesale market involves interstate transactions and energy transmission, and 
is where most regional coordination occurs.  
While electricity delivery services are provided mostly through market, the US power 
system also serves multiple public interests. The primary goal of the power system is to ensure the 
reliable delivery of electricity at the lowest cost to consumers. Because electricity demand is 
variable in time, and uncertain in quantity, power producers, transmission system operators, and 
load serving utilities must be constantly coordinated in real time49 to ensure the balance between 
generation and demand in the power system according to the reliability standards set by regulatory 
agencies. Otherwise, power system failure, such as outages, will cause huge societal costs. This 
balancing service is coordinated by a balancing authority (BA), which matches generating 
resources to electricity demand within its territory—the balancing area.50   
In response to climate change and energy security concerns, increasing the share of 
renewable energy in power supply is an emerging public interest that the power sector serves. 
                                                 
48 Electricity market includes wholesale market and retail market. Electricity wholesale market is the marketplace 
for a generating entity to sell its power generation to a utility or other retailers which then resell the power to end 
consumers in the retail market. Electricity is delivered from generators to retailers through the transmission system.  
    In retail market, electricity is directly sold to consumers who consume power themselves. Electricity is delivered 
through distribution system to end-consumers.  
49 The wholesale market in US operates in two time frames: day ahead and real time. The real-time market reflects 
actual physical supply and demand conditions. The day-ahead market operates in advance of the real-time market. 
The day-ahead market is largely financial, establishing financially-binding, one-day-forward contracts for energy 
transaction. Resources cleared in the day-ahead receive commitment and scheduling instructions from the system 
operator based on day-ahead results and must perform these contractual obligations or be charged the real-time price 
for any products not supplied. However, a number of factors, such as unexpected generation or transmission 
outages, and load forecasting errors, can cause deviation between day-ahead scheduling and real-time dispatching. 
50 Balancing area refers to the collection of generation, transmission, and loads within the metered boundaries of a 
balancing authority.  
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Boosted by federal and state level renewable energy policies, utilization of VERs such as wind 
and solar power has increased substantially in US over the past ten years. High penetration of 
variable generation in the power system create new challenges to the operation of power system 
and wholesale markets. First, it increases the variability and uncertainty of generating resources in 
the power system because its output is intermittent and cannot be accurately predicted at all time 
horizons. In addition, VERs have unique diurnal and seasonal patterns which may not correspond 
to the electricity demand pattern (MIT, 2011; NREL, 2014). Therefore, it requires the transmission 
network to have enough resilience from reserves, storage, or other forms of backup power supply 
to accommodate high level of generation from renewable energy while maintaining its reliability 
at the same time.    
4.2.2 Restructuring of the Electricity Market and Transmission Network Governance  
The restructuring of the US electricity market from mid-1990s and the heterogeneous 
electricity market structures after restructuring formed different transmission network governance 
models across regions. Before the restructuring, electricity markets were served by vertically 
integrated utilities (see Figure 4-2), which possessed and operated all parts of the power system 
including generators, transmission and distribution system. In the wholesale market, electricity 
transactions were between these utilities based on bilateral contracts, either short-term to take 
advantage of one utility having cheaper generation at a moment in time than another utility, or 
longer term to provide needed capacity to the purchasing utility. These transactions were regulated 
by federal governments. Balancing authorities that match electricity generation and demands to 
keep system balance were mostly overlapped with major large utilities.  
Following the FERC’s deregulation orders that promoted competition in the electricity 
wholesale market through opening the access to transmission services, vertically-integrated 
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utilities were required to divest all or some of their generating assets to third parties, and more 
independent power producers also entered the wholesale market. In addition, new forms of 
transmission network governance also emerged in regions that are deregulated. Seven ISO/RTOs 
were set up in 2000s as user-supported and interests-neutral non-profit companies overseen by 
FERC, which do not have any generation and transmission assets, or retail consumers. The 
ISO/RTO operates as a consolidated BA over a large jurisdiction that consists of multiple 
balancing areas before restructuring. As a centralized transmission network coordinator, it controls 
transmission system operation and organizes regional wholesale market transactions using a 
competitive bidding system. 51 Currently, ISO/RTO-governed transmission networks serve two 
thirds of the electricity demand in US (MIT, 2011; Aggarwal and Harvey, 2013). The Southeast 
and most Western states are still dominated by traditional vertically-integrated utility model. In 
these non-RTO regions, transmission networks are controlled and operated by utilities that own 
the transmission systems, and the wholesale market transactions are mostly based on bilateral 
contracts.  
Understanding whether and how these two different transmission network governance 
models affect power system to achieve its multiple public goals is important for future institutional 
designs in the power sector. As for the goal of integrating renewable energy, a few empirical 
studies have provided evidence that wind generation capacity and wind farm performance in RTO-
governed transmission networks is significant higher than non-RTO regions (Hitaj, 2011; Tang, 
2016). However, how different transmission network governance models affect wind generation 
                                                 
51 In the bidding process, generators participating in the wholesale market offer an amount of electricity (MWh) for 
sale during specific periods of the next day at a specific price based on their production costs. These bids are either 
accepted or rejected by the ISO/RTO based on projected electricity demand within its territory. Generators are 
scheduled and dispatched from the least-cost bid to higher cost ones until the total demand is matched. The market 
clearing price is the offer of the last generator dispatched at their location, which is also called locational marginal 
price and paid to all the generators that are dispatched.   
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capacity and performance has not been examined. Several works identify regional collaboration 
on transmission planning and siting as a barrier to renewable energy development and introduce 
recent efforts in both RTO-regions and non-RTO regions to overcome this barrier (Brown and 
Rossi, 2010; Bloom et al., 2010; Wilson and Klass, 2012; Fischlein et al., 2013). Studies on the 
transmission operations are mostly from a technical perspective, which conduct engineering 
simulations to evaluate the performance of different electricity wholesale market designs assuming 
different levels of renewable energy penetration (Milligan and Kirby, 2007; MIT, 2011; Aggarwal 
and Harvey, 2013; Ela et al., 2014; Hunsaker et al., 2013; E3, 2015). There has been a lack of 
network management perspective to compare the two models of transmission network governance 
and analyze how this might be related to different outcomes in renewable energy integration 
between RTO-governed transmission network and non-RTO regions. This paper draws upon 
network governance scholarship to fill this intellectual gap.  
4.3 Theoretical Framework: Network Governance and Effectiveness in Power System  
The term “organizational network” has many different definitions. In fields related to 
public interests, where collective actions are often needed for problem solving, policy 
implementation, or public service delivery, networks are often viewed as groups of legally 
autonomous organizations that work together to achieve collective goals which cannot not be 
effectively achieved by one single organization (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; O’ Toole, 1997; 
Provan and Kenis, 2008; McGuire, 2006; Provan and Milward, 2006; Keast, 2014; Hu et al., 2015).  
In light of this definition, the US power system can be viewed as service delivery networks, 
which consist of multiple electricity market participants that are connected both physically through 
power grids and institutionally in the electricity market to deliver electricity from generators to 
end consumers. In addition to delivering reliable electricity, another important public good it 
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provides is to facilitate large-scale renewable energy deployment so as to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the power sector, which requires regional collaboration among all network 
participants (Koch, 2009; Hall et al., 2009).  
This paper focuses on how the collective actions among participants in the transmission 
networks are organized and coordinated. While network governance in the power sector and its 
possible link to multiple network outcomes has not been studied in existing literature, there has 
been increasing theory building and empirical research on public service implementation networks, 
such as mental health networks (Provan and Milward, 1995; Milward et al., 2009), education 
networks (O’Toole and Meier, 2001 & 2004), and economic development networks (Savas and 
Savas, 2000; Feiock et al., 2010), and problem solving networks such as emergency management 
networks (Kapucu, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Kapucu et al., 2010; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012). In this 
paper, I draw upon these existing network studies to build a theoretical framework analyzing 
network governance and outcomes in the US transmission networks. Particularly, I focus on the 
structural properties and coordinating mechanisms adopted in different network governance 
models. 
4.3.1 Network Effectiveness  
Network effectiveness can be evaluated at network level, community level, or individual 
network participant level (Provan and Milward, 2001). In this paper, I follow the network level 
analysis approach, and define network effectiveness as “the attainment of positive network-level 
outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting 
independently” (Provan and Kenis, 2008). However, the specific type of network-level outcome 
depends on particular constituency assessing the functioning of the network (Milward and Provan, 
1995 & 2001). This paper examines the effectiveness of regional power network in achieving its 
emerging goal– environmental sustainability and energy security. At operational level, increased 
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utilization of renewable energy in the power sector is one of the intermediate goals to attain this 
environmental and energy sustainability (Miranda, 2009; Koch, 2009). Therefore, I will look at 
the effectiveness of the transmission networks in achieving this intermediate goal—increased 
utilization of renewable energy in power supply. 
4.3.2 Network Structure 
Most existing works that examine the determinants of network effectiveness identify 
network structure as a key factor associated with network outcomes. Network structure concerns 
the degree of integration in the network (Provan and Milward, 1995; Provan and Kenis, 2008; 
Raab et al., 2013). Three aspects of network structure are most frequently studied in the literature 
on interorganizational networks: network density, level of centralization, and cliques. Density 
describes the general level of interconnectedness among network participants while centralization 
describes the extent to which this cohesion is organized around particular central agencies (Provan 
and Milward 1995). Instead of considering the whole network system, cliques focuse on the 
subgroups within a large network. A network is more integrated if subgroups within the network 
overlap with each other (Provan and Sebastian, 1998). 
Among these three aspects, this paper focuses on examining how network centralization 
and cliques within the networks affect network outcomes. Density is not considered because all 
the network participants in the regional power system are interconnected through the physical 
power grids. The density of institutional linkages are heavily relied on physical density of 
transmission lines in the regional interconnection, which are more related to transmission siting 
and planning. Since this paper focuses on operations of the power system given existing 
transmission infrastructure rather than transmission planning, network density is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
                  
104 
4.3.2.1 Network centralization 
Network centralization describes the power and control structure of the network – whether 
links and activities are organized around any particular one or small groups of organizations 
(Provan and Milward, 1995; Borgatti et al., 2013). Previous studies on different public 
management networks measure level of network centralization through two indicators. The first 
indicator is the centrality of core agencies, which is measured as the percentage of the link that the 
core agency has in total network links. This linkage-based measurement indicates that the core 
agency is in the central structural position in the network. The second indicator, concentration of 
influence, concerns more about the actual influence of core agencies. This is measured as whether 
influence over decisions related to a particular service is concentrated within a single agency or a 
group of agencies. When agencies in a system act in ways consistent with the wills and 
expectations of core organizations, centrally controlled and coordinated actions are attainable 
(Provan and Milward, 1995). 
Centralized integration is beneficial for network effectiveness, because it facilitates both 
integration and coordination of resources and actions in the network. In addition, a centralized 
network allows effective monitoring of the services because the central broker is in a better 
position to oversee and control the activities of network members. Existing empirical research on 
community mental health service, crime prevention networks, emergency management, and 
regional economic development all suggests that the presence of a powerful lead organization, 
acting as system controller or facilitator, can be critical to the effectiveness of collaborative 
management (Provan and Milward, 1995; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Moynihan, 2005 & 2009; 
Raab et al., 2015).  
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Thus, I expect that the regional transmission network will be more effective in integrating 
wind generation if the network is more centralized, particularly if it is operated under the 
coordination of a single system operator. 
4.3.2.2 Cliques 
In addition to the overall centralization of network, a stream of scholarship in network 
structure research focus on the sub-structure of networks. Within a large network, participants may 
form subgroups in which network members are more interconnected with each other than with 
members outside the subgroups. Clique overlap describes the degree that subgroups within a large 
network overlap with each other. Network effectiveness is enhanced when small cliques of 
agencies have overlapping linkages (Provan and Sabastian, 1998). Where the sub-groups have 
large overlap with each other in terms of network members, we can expect that conflict between 
them is less likely than when the groups don't overlap. Moreover, mobilization and diffusion may 
spread rapidly across the entire network. In empirical network research, a few studies have 
conducted clique analysis to identify sub-groups of key stakeholders with similar beliefs or with 
closer collaborations (Kapucu et al, 2009 &2010; Ansell et al., 2009; Weibel 2011). However, they 
did not analyze the overlaps among cliques.   
In this paper, the substructure of regional transmission network and its relationship to 
network outcome is also examined with the expectation that degree of overlap between cliques 
facilitate the power system to accommodate more wind generation. 
 
4.3.2.3 Mode of governance 
Another series of concepts that describe structural properties of network governance are 
the three modes of governance—shared governance,  lead organization governance, and network 
administration organization (NAO) governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008). These three modes of 
governance are differentiated by two dimensions: 1) whether the network is highly centralized; 
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and 2) whether this network is participant governed or externally governed. Shared governance is 
at one extreme of the first dimension since it is a highly decentralized form – each network 
participant interacts others to govern the network collectively. In contrast, network governed by a 
lead organization or by NAO is highly administrated by a single core agency (or a couple of core 
agencies), with less direct interactions between network participants. The difference between these 
two centralized modes is whether the core agency is a network participant (lead organization 
governance), or is a third party coordinator (NAO governance).  
The relationship between governance modes and network effectiveness has been discussed 
on these two dimensions. Regarding network centralization, Provan and Kenis (2008) propose that 
brokered forms of network governance, like lead organization and NAO governance, are likely to 
be more effective than shared governance when trust among network participants are moderate or 
low, when the size of network becomes larger, when network has diverse goals, and when the need 
for network level competencies are increasing. The power transmission network seems to be a 
typical case that needs brokered network governance since it has multiple goals to meet and 
demands high level of network competencies to manage both internal and external uncertainties. 
As for the second dimension, Raab et al. (2013) argue that an independent external agency would 
be more effective to coordinate a diverse set of participants because it is not embedded in the logic 
or culture of any groups within participants and will be more neutral. However, they do not 
empirically confirm if NAO governed networks lead to better effectiveness than lead agency 
governed networks.  
In this paper, the modes of governance in regional power network are more complicated 
than any single governance mode. I will examine how their structural properties affect network 
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outcomes based on the primary modes proposed by Provan and Kenis, and extend their theoretical 
framework according to the practice in the power sector. 
4.3.3 Coordinating Mechanisms and Process 
In addition to the structural attributes of network, the coordination mechanism and decision 
making process in network also affects its outcome. 
4.3.3.1 Coordination mechanisms 
Starting from Powell (1990), a common approach in network research views network as a 
unique form of governance. This stream of literature compares network with market and hierarchy, 
and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each form. Market is viewed as spontaneous 
coordination mechanism through price signals, and agreements between participants are supported 
by the power of legal sanction. As a paradigm of “individually self-interested, non-cooperative, 
unconstrained social interaction”, competitive market offers choices and flexibility. In hierarchies, 
communication and exchange is organized through clean lines of authority, detailed reporting 
mechanisms, and formal decision-making procedures. Therefore, this form of coordination 
provides reliability and accountability. Comparing to exchange through discrete transactions or 
administrative orders, communication and inter-organizational exchange within network is mostly 
based on reciprocal relationship between network participants. Participants are interdependent on 
each other and they gain through the pooling of resources (Powell, 1990; Jones et al., 1997, Raab, 
2004). Thus, network can achieve outcomes that market or hierarchies cannot, such as reduction 
of uncertainty, fast access to information, and responsiveness.  
However, this network as a form of governance approach treats network undifferentiated 
and ignores the variations among networks in terms of structural patterns and relations among 
participants. Therefore, this paper takes an alternative approach and focuses on the governance 
and management of network themselves (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Recent case studies show that 
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interorganizational networks are governed through a blending of multiple coordinating 
mechanisms (McGuire, 2006). A study on environmental governance network from Robins et al. 
(2011) suggests that older governance forms, including those involving hierarchies and markets, 
are embedded in their own forms of network-like relationships among institutions and actors. 
Networks governed by NAOs or lead organizations in economic development or emergency 
management are often coordinated through command and control procedures by the central 
coordinators while network participants work together collaboratively (Agranoff and McGuire, 
2003; Moynihan, 2006). The transmission networks are also a combination of hierarchical 
coordination, network, and market. I will explore how these coordinating mechanisms blend 
together to improve the utilization of renewable energy in the power system. 
4.3.3.2 Managing the tension between flexibility versus stability 
Network governance involves inherent tensions, such as efficiency-inclusiveness (or unity-
diversity), and flexibility-stability tensions (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 
2011). How to manage these basic tensions are critical to network effectiveness. As for integrating 
renewable energy into the power system, the most salient issue is the need for both system stability 
(reliability) and flexibility.52 Reliability is the primary goal for power system operation while a 
certain level of system flexibility is required to respond to the external uncertainties from variable 
wind resources.  
 In network governance literature, several case studies have either confirmed the 
importance of flexibility or stability in achieving satisfactory network outcomes. Marc et al. (2012) 
suggest that, in the context of disaster response, effective network governance often requires a 
more flexible and sparse network structure. A series of articles on mental health networks find that 
                                                 
52 Flexibility in a power system refers to the ability of the system to cope with variability and uncertainty in both 
generation and demand at various operational timescales (Lannoye et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2013; Ela et al., 2014). 
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network stability is a major determinant of satisfactory performance and the stability is mostly 
attained through NAO’s utilization of consistent contracting procedures, regulations and 
monitoring (Provan and Milward, 1995; Milward et al., 2010). However, there is lack of empirical 
research on governance process and mechanisms that can achieve flexibility and stability at the 
same time, particularly when the network is embedded in a turbulent environment with high 
uncertainties.  Integrating wind power into the power grid requires the power system operation to 
be both flexible and stable, which provides a perfect case to examine how flexibility and stability 
are reconciled in network governance to improve system resilience.  
4.4 Research Design and Methods 
I use a comparative case study approach (Yin, 1984) to examine the impacts of 
transmission network governance on renewable energy integration between two transmission 
networks with different governance models. I start from the theoretical framework set up in Section 
3 to analyze the two cases using content analysis. New themes and insights emerged from the 
transmission network cases are then used to extend the theoretical framework.  
4.4.1 Case Selection: Internal Validity and External Validity 
Among all regional transmission networks shown in Figure 4-1, I select two cases to 
compare: 1) the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) network—an ISO/RTO governed regional transmission 
network, where the electricity wholesale market is organized by MISO; and 2) the Non-RTO West 
network, which are transmission systems in the Western Interconnection excluding ISO/RTO 
governed network. 53  The two cases are selected based on network size, electricity demand, 
renewable energy policy support, wind resource endowment, existing wind generation capacity, 
transmission infrastructure, and other factors that affect network governance and/or wind power 
                                                 
53 The only ISO/RTO-governed transmission network in the Western Interconnection is the area coordinated by the 
California Independent System Operator (Figure 4-1), which is excluded for the purpose of comparing different 
transmission governance models.  
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generation. Control of these factors allows me to focus the comparison on network governance 
and examine how these governance attributes affect wind power integration in these two regions.  
In addition to the internal validity established through case comparison, insights drawn 
from these two cases can also inform transmission network governance design in other regions in 
US. MISO and the Non-RTO West represent two major transmission network governance models 
in the US–the ISO/RTO model and non-RTO model respectively. While there are some variations 
among regional transmission networks within each category, there has been a large degree of 
convergence in general principles of market design and transmission system operation among 
regions governed by the same model (Miranda, 2009).  
4.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis  
To develop an in-depth picture of each case, I draw on extensive qualitative and 
quantitative archival data collected from all network participants in each case, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), FERC, and Fectiva news database. This secondary data is 
supplemented by data from interviews with multiple key stakeholders from each network. A 
detailed account of each case is established based on triangulation of these different data sources, 
which reassures that the interpretations of these two cases are not shaped by idiosyncratic evidence.  
 As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, effectiveness of wind power integration in transmission 
network is measured by the utilization rate of wind power in each region. One common indicator 
for the utilization rate is capacity factor, which is the ratio of actual wind generation to the potential 
maximum generation if all wind farms in the region were operated at their full capacities 
throughout the year. 54  Wind generation and generating capacity data for the two regions is 
collected from the EIA database.  
                                                 
54 Capacity factor of wind power = 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦×24 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠×365 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
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For network structural properties and coordinating mechanisms in MISO network and the 
Non-RTO West, I collect archival documents from all network members55, coordinating agencies 
(i.e. MISO, West Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), and other sub-regional coordinators 
in Non-RTO West), state regulators that involved in the two regional transmission networks, and 
FERC. To triangulate with this archival data, I also extract news articles about transmission system 
operation and renewable energy integration in these two regional networks from Fectiva database. 
These news articles cover the years from the formation of MISO till the end of 2015.56  
In addition, I use data from semi-structured phone interviews with a diverse set of 
stakeholders from MISO network and Non-RTO West to supplement the findings from secondary 
data sources. For MISO, seven interviews were conducted with staff from MISO, independent 
wind power producers, transmission system owners, and an academic researcher. For Non-RTO 
West, five interviews were conducted with staff from WECC, two balancing 
authorities/transmission system operators, independent wind power producers. In all interviews, 
people were asked to talk about their agency’s daily operation regarding power scheduling and 
real-time dispatching, and the advantages or barriers for the regional transmission network to 
integrate wind power. Through coding this interview data, I obtain more insights into the 
transmission system operation, market coordination process adopted in each regional network, and 
how these coordinating mechanisms or market designs have promoted or impeded the utilization 
of wind power.   
                                                 
55 I collect annual market reports and/or reliability reports from 432 participants in MISO network and 420 
participants in the Non-RTO West. These reports summarize market operation or transmission system operation 
from the perspectives of participants in different segments of the power system, including generation and 
transmission. Balancing authorities in Non-RTO West are mostly overlapped with large utilities that also own and 
operate transmission systems.  
56 News articles are extracted from Fectiva through key words searching. Key words include “transmission”, “wind 
power”, “renewable energy”, “interconnection”, “grid operation”, “wholesale market”, and “curtailment”. 
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All textual data is coded using a qualitative software NVivo 10. A total of 4026 text units 
(including technical or market reports, news articles, and interview transcripts) are coded. I start 
the coding process with key concepts of network structure and coordinating mechanisms identified 
in my theoretical framework and then modify this framework with new codes emerged from the 
two cases. The coding process shapes the relevance, meaning, and interconnection of concepts. 
The interconnections of key concepts in the context of transmission networks emerge through 
recursive cycling among case data, existing literature on network governance, and emerging theory.   
4.4.3 Case Summaries 
In the MISO network, MISO, serves as the centralized system operator and reliability 
coordinator, operates the transmission system and a centrally dispatched market in portions of 15 
states in the Midwest and the South. This centralized market was developed over the past 15 years. 
MISO was formed as an ISO in December 2001 and began to organize the regional electricity 
wholesale market in 2005.  In 2009, MISO started operating an ancillary services market and 
combined its 24 separate balancing areas into a single balancing area. In 2013, the MISO 
transmission network extends to the South region, including parts of Arkansas, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas.  
The Non-RTO West network includes transmission systems in the Western Interconnection 
within the US territory except for CAISO. The Western Interconnection is one of four major 
electric system networks in North America, which covers all or part of 15 states in the US. While 
the whole network consists of 38 balancing areas operated as separate wholesale markets, they are 
coordinated by WECC to ensure system reliability.  
In this paper, comparison between these two networks focuses on their most recent 
structure and governance mechanisms after MISO consolidated its balancing authorities in 2009. 
Table 4-1 shows the comparison between these two networks on a series of case selection criteria 
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(based on 2014 statistics), which affect both network governance and utilization of wind power. 
First, we see that the two regional transmission networks have similar size in terms of service 
territory, network participants, and electricity demand they serve. Network participants mainly 
include power producers, transmission system owners/operators, and load serving entities (utilities 
that purchase electricity in the wholesale market).  
In addition to the size of network and scope of operation, we can observe that most states 
in either MISO territory or Non-RTO West have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards, which 
is a major policy tool that state-level governments often use to increase the utilization of wind 
power in power supply (Kim & Tang, 2014; Yin & Powers, 2010; Carley, 2009; Carley & Browne, 
2013).  
Despite the fact that MISO has significantly less high voltage transmission lines for wind 
farms than Non-RTO West in 2014, there are similar existing wind power generation capacity with 
comparable wind resources on average in these two regions in 2014. Moreover, available wind 
generation capacity in these two regions are very close from 2009 to 2014 as shown in Figure 4-3.  
Given existing transmission network infrastructure and similar features in network size, 
renewable energy policy support, wind resources, and wind generation capacity between the two 
cases, the relationship between network governance and the effectiveness of these two networks 
in integrating wind power will be analyzed in the following section.  
4.5 Case Analysis and Findings  
4.5.1 Network Effectiveness in Wind Power Integration 
In this paper, I adopt objective measurement—the average capacity factor of wind power 
in the network—to measure network level effectiveness regarding wind power integration. This 
measurement captures utilization/performance of existing wind generation capacity in the power 
system (Wiser et al., 2011 & 2012). Since wind generation capacities and wind resources for these 
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generating units are similar between MISO network and non-RTO West, higher utilization of 
existing capacity indicates that the regional transmission network better integrates wind energy 
into the system.    
Figure 4-4 shows the average capacity factor of wind power in these two regional networks 
over the period 2010-2014, which covers the period after MISO network has consolidated as one 
balancing area. While the utilization rate of wind power increases about 10 percentage points in 
both regional networks, the average capacity factor of wind power in MISO is 3 to 4 percentage 
points higher than Non-RTO West across all these five years. This is equivalent to approximately 
10% higher than the utilization rate of wind power in Non-RTO West. At individual wind farm 
level, as shown in Figure 4-5, MISO has larger share of wind farms with higher capacity factor 
than Non-RTO West among wind farms in the same wind quality class. Thus, the comparisons at 
network level and individual wind farm level both indicate that MISO network does a better job 
integrating wind power than the Non-RTO West.  
Since the case selection process has controlled factors that may affect wind power 
utilization, such as network and market size, policy support for renewable energy, wind resources, 
and wind generating capacity, different effectiveness in integrating wind power between MISO 
and Non-RTO West may be attributed to network governance factors.  Following the theoretical 
framework in Section 4.3, I will discuss how network structure and coordinating mechanisms in 
these two networks affect wind power utilization. 
4.5.2 Network Structure and Resource Pooling 
4.5.2.1  Level of centralization  
The two regional transmission systems have apparently different level of centralization. To 
be more specific, one major difference between the two networks is whether the operation of 
transmission system and wholesale market is integrated and coordinated centrally through an 
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independent system operator. This structural difference is important in understanding case 
outcome. For both cases, the most recurring theme came up from the data regarding wind power 
integration and grid operation is “consolidation” or “centralized operation”.  
Following the theories on network centralization, I further examine two aspects of network 
centralization: core agency centrality and centration of influence (Provan & Milward, 1995). In a 
transmission network, the first aspect concerns whether network links are organized around any 
particular one or small groups of organization while the second aspect captures whether influence 
over decisions related to system operation and electricity market coordination is concentrated 
within a single core agency.  
The MISO network has a highly centralized structure. MISO is the single core agency that 
connects all power producers and load serving entities within its territory. As for the concentration 
of influence, MISO serves as the central authority that controls and oversees the transmission 
system operation, and coordinates the wholesale electricity market.  
In contrast, the non-RTO West has more decentralized network structure, where the 
transmission system and electricity wholesale market is jointly coordinated by 33 balancing 
authorities (BA).57 These BAs are each responsible for balancing the generation to loads within its 
balancing area so that their combined efforts will keep the entire non-RTO West balanced and 
reliable. A stakeholder in the Western Interconnection commented that “the divided operation of 
the interconnected western grid is not unlike having a bus with 38 drivers”. From the perspective 
of linkage-based centrality, each BA connects and coordinates limited generators and load serving 
entities within its balancing area.  
                                                 
57 The Western Interconnection has 38 BAs. Here, I did not include the four BAs outside the US territory and 
California ISO in my case.  
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             Comparing to decentralized system operation in Non-RTO West, centralized system 
operation and market coordination in MISO network allows resource pooling. The larger resource 
pool provides the central network broker with more options that can be used to accommodate 
variations in electricity supply and demand, particularly when there is high penetration of wind 
energy. Given similar generating capacity and electricity demand between the two regional 
networks as summarized in Table 4-1, each BA in Non-RTO west only has control over generating 
and transmission resources within its territory while MISO, as the single network administrative 
organization, can allocate all the generating and transmission resources within the whole MISO 
network to balance generation and loads. This resource pooling is even more important for wind 
power integration. Since wind power increases the variability and uncertainty in power system 
operation, it demands more fast-response operating reserves58  in the system to deal with the 
imbalances when any wind generator fails to commit to the scheduled generation. As mentioned 
in the reports and interview data, “MISO can take on more renewable energy with minimal 
curtailment because this pooled market has more generating units to ramp up and ramp down 
quickly to balance the variable generation”. In addition, variation in aggregate wind output tend to 
be less correlated over larger geographic regions, which is another benefit of resource pooling. In 
contrast, BAs in Non-RTO West can only mobilize resources within its territory to accommodate 
the variation and uncertainty caused by wind power. Existing studies have demonstrated that “this 
method drives up integration costs, and limits the amount of wind and other variable generation 
that can be connected to the system in a region” (WECC, 2013).   
                                                 
58 In power systems, operating reserves are the generating capacities available to the system operator within a short 
interval of time to meet demand in case there is an unplanned event disrupt scheduled generation or changes in 
demand. These may be additional generating units that are standby or generators that are already producing power 
but can ramp up or down their output upon request. 
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The above comparison shows that transmission network integrated and coordinated 
centrally through a single core agency is likely to be more effective in integrating wind power than 
a less centralized networks. This finding is consistent with previous literature studying service 
implementation networks in mental health services, crime prevention, and emergency management. 
Moreover, the two cases on transmission networks add to existing theory the underlying linkage 
between centralization and network effectiveness. A centralized network enables resources 
pooling, which provides the NAO with comprehensive information and more available resources 
to allocate than a less cohesive system does. This is crucial for the entire system to effectively 
manage the variation and uncertainty imposed by the environment.  
4.5.2.2 Mode of governance 
A related concept to level of centralization is the “mode of governance” proposed by 
Provan and Kenis (2008). MISO network is an NAO governed network, where MISO serves as 
the single NAO that coordinates transmission operation and market transactions. The mode of 
governance in Non-RTO West is more ambiguous. First, it is a hybrid of lead organization 
governed network within each balancing area, and shared governance among these lead 
organizations at aggregate level. However, there are several external brokers that have 
organizational links across several balancing areas, or even connects all network participants in 
the non-RTO West. One example of these external brokers is the WECC–an independent non-
profit agency that coordinates all network participants to achieve mandatory reliability standards 
from FERC. While centrality of WECC is equivalent to MISO according to organizational links, 
it only takes on part of the governance activities that MISO does, which is ensuring system 
reliability. The authority over system operation and market coordination is fragmented and shared 
among 33 balancing authorities. On the contrary, MISO is the sole decision making authority for 
electricity scheduling and dispatching, market coordination, and reliability coordination.  
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The comparison between MISO and Non-RTO West indicates that structural position is 
not equivalent to the actual influence (Provan and Milward, 1995). Concentration of influence 
tends to be a more essential aspect of centralization. The mere existence of an NAO does not 
necessarily lead to better network outcome, it is more important that decision making authorities 
on all relevant aspects of transmission network operation are concentrated in that single agency. 
Coming back to the two dimensions that characterize different modes of governance (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008), the two transmission network cases suggest that the level of centralization does 
matter for network effectiveness. However, it is not clear whether the centralized control from an 
external agency or from a lead participant results in better network outcomes. Within the 
dimension of centralization, the concentration of influence is a more substantial determinant than 
structural position.  
4.5.2.3 Resource exchange among cliques  
I now turn to examine the subgroups within network, which is referred to as “cliques” in 
the network analysis literature. While the transmission system operation and wholesale market 
sales in Non-RTO West are not governed through a central agency, it consists of 33 sub-regional 
cliques coordinated by separate BAs. These cliques are formed based on geographic proximity. In 
theory, an alternative approach to network integration is through overlap of cliques (Provan and 
Sabastian, 1998). However, I did not find any document or interview mentioning “overlap” 
between these subgroups. Instead, they mention the “interchange” or “exchange” of resources 
between neighboring cliques. One interviewee from the Non-RTO West comments that “increased 
coordination between neighboring balancing areas allows greater utilization of load and resource 
diversity, which reduce the magnitude of wind curtailment”. This improved coordination occurs 
through two ways–increasing the frequency of resource exchange between neighboring balancing 
areas, or reducing the interchange limits between them. Currently, the Western interconnection 
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has initiated “Intra-Hour Transaction Accelerator Platform (I-TAP)” to replace the hourly 
interchange and facilitate interactions across balancing areas, which can provides each clique with 
more ramping capacity to manage the variability and uncertainty of wind power (Hunsaker et al., 
2013). In addition to more frequent resource exchange, relaxing the constraints on interregional 
exchange is also expected to reduce curtailment of renewable energy (Hunsaker et al., 2013; E3, 
2015). 
Therefore, if resource pooling cannot not be achieved through centralized coordination in 
a regional transmission network, increased exchange of resources among cliques, as an alternative, 
can also improve wind power integration.  
4.5.3 Governance Processes to Achieve Flexibility and Stability  
4.5.3.1 Coordinating mechanisms: A hybrid of hierarchy, market, and collaboration 
In this section, I compare how transmission system and the electricity wholesale market 
are coordinated in these two networks and whether different coordination mechanisms and 
processes lead to variation in wind power utilization. 
As introduced in Section 4.2, the primary goal of power system operation is to ensure 
system stability, or “reliability of the bulk power system” as used in electricity regulatory 
documents. However, integration of renewable energy, particularly the variable generation such 
as wind power, challenges system stability because wind output are more variable and 
unpredictable than traditional generating resources. This requires a certain level of flexibility in 
the power system to manage the variability and uncertainty from the environment in order to 
maintain system reliability. Having adequate operational reserves on the system is essential to 
provide this flexibility. These reserves may be provided through generating units that are not 
dispatched or generators that are already producing power but can ramp up or down their output 
upon request by the system operator.  
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To achieve system stability, both MISO network and Non-RTO West network use 
hierarchical control schemes. As described in Section 4.5.2, both MISO and Non-RTO West have 
core coordinating agencies—MISO and BAs in the Western Interconnection—to balance 
generation and load continuously. While these agencies have coordinating authorities over 
different levels of territories, their functions are similar. They collect information from load 
serving entities to conduct demand forecasting for their balancing areas, schedule and dispatch 
generators to meet the demand, and employ different types of operating reserves to offset the 
deviations due to changes in generation or demand in real time. All these operations are conducted 
according to established protocols approved by FERC. In addition, compliance of reliability 
standards in MISO system and Non-RTO West is monitored and enforced by reliability 
coordinators. MISO is the reliability coordinator while the Western Electricity Coordination 
Council (WECC) ensures reliability for the non-RTO West.  
Despite similar hierarchical control to maintain system stability, the wholesale markets in 
these two networks are coordinated differently, which leads to different levels of flexibility to 
manage the variable wind generation. MISO coordinates the wholesale market through 
competitive bidding mechanism while most of the electricity transactions in Non-RTO West occur 
through long-term bilateral contracts negotiated between generator and buyer directly. 
As the central system operator and balancing authority in the network, MISO uses 
competitive bidding process to organize and co-optimize energy market (i.e. match generation with 
electricity demand) and the transactions of operational reserves. This bidding process allows 
system operator to schedule and dispatch generating resources at their most efficient operating 
point based on their bid-cost curve. The bidding process for operational reserve transactions 
incentivizes generators to offer their surplus generating capacity into the reserve market pool based 
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on the marginal cost of reserve supply, and provides flexibility for MISO to mobilize reserves 
when they are needed.  
In Non-RTO West, most electricity transactions operate through bilateral contracts. Within 
each balancing area, generators with bilateral contractual commitments provide the balancing 
authority with scheduled output before the market clears, and this schedule is fixed regardless of 
the market price. Although the balancing authority still dispatches these resources to meet the 
expected demand in its balancing area, it cannot utilize these generating units as operational 
reserves to respond to changes in generation or demand in real time. Thus, considerable generating 
resources scheduled based on bilateral contracts reduces the flexibility that the system/market 
operator has in order to respond to variability or uncertainty in the system. As mentioned in reports 
from several BAs in the Non-RTO West and interviews, this insufficient flexibility drives the need 
for more expensive sources to provide flexibility, such as regulating reserves and storage, which 
increases costs to accommodate high level of variable generation in the grid.  
From a network governance theory perspective, the above two cases demonstrate that 
hierarchy, market, and collaborative process coexist in transmission networks to coordinate system 
operation. This finding reinforces the perspective from Provan and Kenis (2008) that we should 
combine the network analytical approach and network as a form of governance approach to study 
how networks themselves are managed. Depending on the tasks that the network needs to complete 
and the structural patterns among participants, network can be governed through market, hierarchy, 
reciprocity, or other hybrid mechanisms. 
In addition, the transmission network governance also demonstrates how to manage the 
tension between flexibility and stability in network governance through the deployment of hybrid 
governance forms. In the power sector, where the system is constantly facing internal and external 
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uncertainties, hierarchical control and formal rules are essential to coordinate various network 
participants to achieve system stability. However, those external centralized coordinators are 
usually created by network participants in order to achieve shared goals. At the same time, various 
market mechanisms are employed to provide flexibility in the system. Comparing to bilateral 
contracts, competitive bidding process organized by the system/market operator allows more 
flexible utilization of generating resources through price signals.  
4.5.3.2 Timeframe for resource exchange 
Another important theme of system operation and market coordination emerged from the 
data is the timeframe of market operation or dispatch in real time. As introduced in Section 4.2, 
the day-ahead scheduling requires generators to commit a certain amount of generation hourly 
based on demand during a particular hour of a day. The real energy exchange between suppliers 
and buyers may deviate from the schedules due to changes in demand or supply, which requires 
timely response and adjustment to ensure system stability. The market operation design in MISO 
and Non-RTO West provides different timeframe for network participants to respond to changes 
and make adjustment.  
MISO’s real-time market operates on a five-minute time frame, where generating units 
hold their output at a specific level for each five-minute dispatch period. The balancing authorities 
in Non-RTO West conduct hourly dispatch so that generators need to follow hourly schedules set 
one hour or more in advance. This constrains the ability of the system operator to manage 
variability, particularly with high penetration of wind power in the grid. Wind output can vary 
significantly over the timeframe of an hour due to the variability of wind speed, but it tends to be 
relatively constant over ten to fifteen minutes. In Non-RTO West with hourly schedules and 
dispatch, significant deviations in wind output over the course of an hour often need be 
accommodated through the use of regulation services, which are typically the most expensive type 
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of reserves (Hunsaker et al., 2013). Shorter market timeframe provides better access to generator 
flexibility than longer market periods. The five-minute markets in MISO plays a large role in 
keeping incremental load following costs for higher wind penetrations low.  
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion  
This paper examines how network governance affects the effectiveness of power 
transmission networks in regards to wind power integration through a comparative case study. 
Massive integration of variable generation from wind imposes higher level of variability and 
uncertainty to the power system and requires better coordination among network participants to 
maintain system resilience. I compare the performance and governance between two regional 
transmission networks in the US—the MISO network and the Non-RTO West network. They 
represent two major types of transmission network governance models in the US, which are 
different in terms of network structure and coordinating mechanisms/processes. MISO network is 
a NAO-governed network with MISO as the single core agency among stakeholders from different 
segments of the power sector. In contrast, Non-RTO West is a hybrid of shared-governance among 
local balancing authorities at aggregate level and lead organization governance within each 
balancing area.  
4.6.1 Implications for Theories on Network Governance  
Through the case of integrating wind energy into the power system, this paper studies the 
impacts of network structure and coordinating mechanisms on the resilience of complex service 
delivery and resource management systems that operate over large geographic scales. It extends 
existing network theories by highlighting the underlying mechanisms that particular network 
structural properties and coordinating processes can achieve both system stability and flexibility, 
thus lead to better network performance.  
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Consistent with previous studies on network structure, this paper finds that a centralized 
transmission network is more effective in integrating wind power than a less centralized structure. 
Moreover, the transmission network case adds to existing theory the linkage between centralization 
and network effectiveness. A centralized network coordinated by a single core agency allows 
resource pooling and optimal allocating of the resources by the central coordinator, which is crucial 
for the entire system to effectively manage the variability and uncertainty imposed by the 
environment. This paper also suggests an alternative path to improved network effectiveness for a 
less cohesive network, which is through more frequent resource exchange among subgroups within 
a large network. This finding extends the existing theories on cliques, which argues that overlap 
among cliques enhances network effectiveness (Provan and Sabastian, 1998). This paper finds that 
enhanced effectiveness can also be achieved through more resource exchange between cliques 
instead of having overlapped members. 
Since integrating wind energy into the power system requires the whole system to be 
flexible and stable at the same time, this paper also contributes to the network governance literature 
by providing empirical evidence on how to manage the tension between flexibility and stability, 
particularly when the network operates in a turbulent environment with changes and uncertainties. 
The two transmission network cases show that a hybrid of different coordinating mechanisms are 
embedded in the network governance process to address the needs for system stability and 
flexibility. Hierarchical control through orders, formal rules, and reporting mechanisms can ensure 
system stability while market mechanisms through price and competition, or collaboration formed 
among participants provides more flexibility in the system. Instead of viewing these forms as 
discrete governance forms, they actually coexist in some complex service delivery systems and 
complementary to each other to enhance system resilience.  
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Coming back to Provan and Kenis’s three modes of governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008), 
the transmission network cases indicate that network governance configurations in the real world 
are usually more complicated, and sometimes ambiguous to be captured by a single mode. It is 
worth considering from the two dimensions that characterize different modes of governance—
level of centralization and source of control. While it is still not clear whether control from an 
external agency or from a network participant leads to better outcome as previous empirical 
analysis indicates (Raab et al., 2016), this paper suggests that the level of centralization does matter 
for network effectiveness. Particularly, concentration of decision making authority is a more 
substantial determinant than the structural position of the central broker.  
4.6.2 Implications for Transmission Network and Wholesale Market Design 
Drawn upon network governance theoretical framework, this comparative case study of 
two regional transmission networks in US also informs future design of transmission system and 
electricity wholesale market.  
The findings regarding network structure suggest that effective integration of variable 
generation from renewable energy can be achieved either through consolidation of balancing 
authorities into a more centralized coordinator like MISO, or through more frequent resource 
exchange between neighboring balancing areas. If fully consolidation of balancing authorities is 
not feasible due to institutional barriers or historical reasons for the non-RTO regions in the West 
or in the Southeast, agreement between adjacent balancing areas on shorter resource interchange 
timeframe or lower exchange limits could be alternative mechanisms to better integrate VERs. 
These findings provide justifications for the ongoing efforts in non-RTO regions to consolidate 
BAs into a single system operator in some balancing areas, or to improve coordination among a 
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few BAs to facilitate more frequent resource sharing among their balancing areas (Kirby and 
Milligan, 2008; PNNL, 2010; Pierce, 2014). 59 
As for network coordinating mechanisms, this paper finds that the co-optimization of 
energy market and reserve market through competitive bidding process offer the system operators 
more flexibility to address the unexpected deviation caused by variable wind generation than 
bilateral contracts and self-scheduling. Therefore, it is desirable to incentivize suppliers to allow 




                                                 
59 Examples of these efforts are the Reserve Sharing Program of the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP), and the within-
hour transmission purchase and scheduling business practice in the Western Interconnection. The NWPP reserve 
sharing program is a collaborative initiative among more than ten balancing authorities in the northwest region within 
the Western Interconnection. Participating BAs are entitled to use not only the reserve resources in its balancing area, 
but also to call on other participants for help if internal reserve cannot fully cover the deviation between schedules 
and real-time dispatch. The within-hour transmission purchase and scheduling business practice allows better use of 
capacity within and outside BA by using shorter timeframe for scheduling.  
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Table 4-1  Comparison between MISO and Non-RTO West on Case Selection Criteria 
Transmission Network 
(based on 2014 statistics60) 
MISO Non-RTO West 
Size of the Network 






2) Number of network 
participants 
432 420 
3) Annual Electricity Demand 
(GWh) 
691,000 614,000 
Policy Support for Renewable 
Energy: # of states having Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
11 11 
Wind Resources (Average wind quality 














2)   Average Interconnecting  






Source: 2015 WECC SOTI Final Report (WECC, 2015); CAISO lists of market participants: 
http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/OurBusiness/Default.aspx; MISO corporate fact sheet (MISO, 2016); MISO 
current members by sector; EIA 860 survey (EIA, 2014).  
 
Note:  
1. Wind Resources: The Energy Information Administration (EIA) distinguishes between 7 classes of wind 
power resources based on wind speed at a height of 50 meters. In general, areas designated class 3 or 
greater are suitable for most utility-scale wind farms, whereas class 2 areas are marginal for utility-scale 
wind plants.  
 
  
                                                 
60 The 2014 data is most recent and comprehensive data available for both regional networks.  
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Table 4-2  Comparisons between MISO and Non-RTO West on Structural Properties and 
Governance Processes 
 






Highly centralized  through the 
coordination of  a single core 
agency (MISO)  better resource 









No Cliques Resource exchange between 
cliques is hourly based; 
Interchange cap  limit 





Hierarchical control: external 
independent system coordinator 
system stability 
 
Competitive bidding process in 
both energy and reserve market 
improved system flexibility  
 
Hierarchical control: lead 




Bilateral long-term contract 
between generators and load-
serving entities  limited 
flexibility of resource 
allocation for system operator 
Governance processes: 
Frequency of resource 
exchange 
Five minutes market  more 
flexible and timely to respond to 
generation deviation 
Hourly market  less 
flexibility 
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Source: Sustainable FERC Project, 2016. 
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Municipal utilities/local cooperatives 
Generation Transmission Distribution 
Vertically-integrated utility (IOU) 









Vertically-integrated utility (IOU)/Public utilities 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cumulative Wind Power Capacity (MW) 
MISO Non-RTO WECC
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
MISO 0.304 0.335 0.337 0.332 0.403
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Figure 4-5  Performance of Wind Farms by Wind Quality Class (Year 2014)  
 
Note: The EIA distinguishes between 7 classes of wind power resources based on wind speed at a height of 50 
meters. In general, areas designated class 3 or greater are suitable for most utility-scale wind farms, whereas class 2 
areas are marginal for utility-scale wind plants.  
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